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Abstract
This Note argues that Argentina’s acceptance of de facto laws, regardless of their nature, hin-
ders the transition to democracy, a factor that outweighs considerations for the public’s expecta-
tions of rights vested by de facto laws. Part I analyzes Argentina’s political history, particularly the
nation’s experiences with constitutional and de facto governments. Part I also offers a synopsis on
how the Argentine Supreme Court has treated de facto laws throughout the Republic’s history. Part
II presents arguments supporting the legitimacy of de facto laws and the need to protect expecta-
tions based upon them. Part II also examines arguments positing that de facto laws are illegitimate
because of their source and that acceptance of them would create a dangerous precedent. Part III
argues that the legitimization of de facto laws by express or tacit congressional ratification as set
forth in Aramayo offers the best solution as it both protects the rule of law and legitimate expec-
tations based upon de facto laws while helping to create foundations for democratic institutions
in Argentina. This Note concludes that Argentina’s existing treatment of de facto laws as legiti-
mate endangers Argentina’s transition to democracy, especially, the creation of strong democratic
institutions.
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THE RULE OF LAW OVER THE LAW OF
RULERS: THE TREATMENT OF DE
FACTO LAWS IN ARGENTINA
Tim Dockery*
INTRODUCTION
In 1983, constitutional1 and democratic government 2 re-
turned to Argentina. 3 During the seven year absence of constitu-
tional and democratic government from 1976 to 1983, a defacto
government, 4 a government that rules by force rather than by
constitutional right,5 ruled the country. 6 This de facto govern-
ment seized power in a coup d'etat,7 a manner of succession not
enumerated in the Argentine Constitution.8 The defacto regime
* J.D. Candidate, 1997, Fordham University. The Author thanks MCI, the Zaf-
faronis, and Dr. Gulco for financial and academic support.
1. K.C. WHEARE, MODERN CONSTITUTIONS 1-2 (2d prtg. 1966). A constitutional gov-
ernment is a government that rules according to a selection of rules. Id. A constitu-
tional government need not be democratic. Id. at 4. A country that has a constitution
does not have a constitutional government if the government of that country circum-
vents the constitution in its exercise of power. Id.
2. Ra6l R. Alfonsin, The Function of the Judicial Power During the Transition, in THE
TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THEJUDICIARY 39, 41 (Irwin
P. Stotzky ed., 1993) [hereinafter TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY]. A democracy is a repre-
sentative and participatory government that "encompasses a rule of law bound by the
central requisites of liberalism-a set of traditional civil and political rights that serve to
deter state action as well as permit economic, social, and cultural choices-commonly
referred to as 'human rights,' and which complements free and popular elections." Id.
3. Id. at 42.
4. J. Irizarry y Puente, The Nature and Powers of a "De Facto" Government in Latin
America, 30 TUL. L. REv. 15, 25 (1955). A de facto government is a government that
.usurps power by force, in violation of established constitutional and legal forms of
secession, by deposing the lawful authorities and arrogating provincially all or some of
the functions of government." Id.
5. Id.
6. Alfonsin, supra note 2, at 42.
7. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 351 (6th ed. 1990) [hereinafter BLACK]. A coup d'etat is
the overthrow of government by force. Id.
8. CONST. ARG. Unless otherwise noted, all references to the Argentine Constitu-
tion will be to the Argentine Constitution of 1853 as updated by the Constituent Assem-
bly of 1994. All quotations to the Argentine Constitution are from translations found in
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD. CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD: ARGENTINA 29 (Gisbert
H. Flanz ed., 1995) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONS].
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exercised the functions of government, enacted laws,9 issued de-
crees, t1 regulated legislation,11 and gave judicial sentences 12 in
an authoritarian manner.13 Argentina has lived under five such
defacto governments this century. 14
The transition in 1983 from an authoritarian government to
a democracy1 5 sparked numerous questions in Argentina. 6 One
question asks how a constitutional and democratic government
should treat defacto laws, 17 the laws, decrees, and regulations of a
9. Godoy v. Universidad Nacional de La Plata, [1991-II] J.A. 455, 459 (1990). A
law is that which "must be obeyed and followed by its citizens subject to sanctions and
legal consequences." BLACK, supra note 7, at 884. According to the Argentine Constitu-
tion, the legislature is the primary enactor of laws. CONsT. ARC. arts. 44-86. The defacto
government from 1976 to 1983 legislated itself into government with a defacto law. Acta
para el Proceso de Reorganizacidn Nacional, 36-B ANALES DE LEGISLACI6N ARGENTINA [here-
inafter A.D.L.A.] 1019 (1976). Defacto governments in Argentina have issued laws in an
array of areas, including taxation, judicial reform, penal law, and the Civil Code.
Irizarry y Puente, supra note 4, at 47-53.
10. Godoy, [1991-I1] J.A. at 459. A decree is a "an authoritative order having the
force of law." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 344 (Wil-
liam Morris ed., 10th prtg. 1981). In Argentina, the executive may rule by decree in
situations of necessity and urgency. CONST. ARG. art. 99, cl. 3. Examples of areas in
which Argentine de facto governments have issued decrees include the declaration of
war, labor regulation, rent control, and the prohibition of registering children's names
that are not in Spanish or are deemed ridiculous. Irizarry y Puente, supra note 4, at 46-
53.
11. Godoy, [1991-II] J.A. at 459. A regulation is a "rule or order having the force of
law issued by executive authority of government" that further defines a preexisting law.
BLACK, supra note 7, at 1286.
12. Goday, [1991-I] J.A. at 459.
13. Julie M. Taylor, Technocracy and National Identity: Attitudes Toward Economic Pol-
icy, in FROM MILITARY RULE TO LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN ARGENTINA 131, 133-34 (Monica
Peralta-Ramos & Carlos H. Waisman eds., 1987) [hereinafter LIBERAL DEMOCRACY]. An
authoritarian government is one that rules in a totalitarian fashion and does not permit
input in decisions from those who do not hold power. Id.
14. DONALD B. HODGES, ARGENTINA'S "DIRT WAR": AN INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY 9
(1991).
. 15. Alejandro M. Garro, Nine Years of Transition to Democracy in Argentina: Partial
Failure or Qualified Success?, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 4 (1993). A transition to
democracy is not just a "mere return to government by consent, which is just one step
in a long-term movement towards the consolidation of a truly democratic regime," but
it is also an "on-going process involving gradual changes of social mentality or ethos, a
process that brings into question the relationship between actual operation of legal
institutions and the consolidation of democracy." Id.
16. Irwin P. Stotzky & Carlos S. Nino, The Difficulties of the Transition Process, in
TRANSITON TO DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 3, 3. Among the larger questions are how
to create strong democratic institutions, whether and how to prosecute for human
rights violations of defacto governments, how to achieve political and economic stability,
and how to ensure respect for the rule of law. Id.
17. Carlos S. Nino, On the Exercise ofjudicial Review in Argentina, in TRANSrrION TO
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defacto government.18 If Argentina treats defacto laws as equal to
the laws of a de jure19 government, a government that rules by
constitutional right,20 Argentina might hamper its transition to
democracy.21 By contrast, if the constitutional Government
voids de facto laws, the Argentine Government may jeopardize
the public's faith in the law and its expectations of rights vested
by de facto laws.22
This Note argues that Argentina's acceptance of de facto
laws, regardless of their nature, hinders the transition to democ-
racy, a factor that outweighs considerations for the public's ex-
pectations of rights vested by defacto laws. Part I analyzes Argen-
tina's political history, particularly the nation's experiences with
constitutional and de facto governments. Part I also offers a sy-
nopsis on how the Argentine Supreme Court has treated defacto
laws throughout the Republic's history. Part II presents argu-
ments supporting the legitimacy of defacto laws and the need to
protect expectations based upon them. Part II also examines ar-
guments positing that de facto laws are illegitimate because of
their source and that acceptance of them would create a danger-
ous precedent. Part III argues that the legitimization of defacto
laws by express or tacit congressional ratification as set forth in
Aramayo23 offers the best solution as it both protects the rule of
law and legitimate expectations based upon de facto laws while
helping to create foundations for democratic institutions in Ar-
DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 309, 318. Defacto laws are the laws, rules, and decrees of de
facto governments. Id.
18. Jorge A. Sandro, iLeyes penales tdeitas 6 implicitas?, [1992-D] L.L. 82, 82-88
(1992); Nino, supra note 17, at 317-20; Enrique Vera Villalobos, Un "Obiter Dictum" ino-
portuno, [1991-11] J.A. 462, 462-67 (1991); Aristides H.M. Corti, Algunas reflexiones sobre
leyes defacto [sic] y derechos adquiridos, [1984-B] L.L. 970, 970-73 (1983). This problem
was evident before the military government transferred power. Carlos S. Nino, Una
nueva estrategia para el tratamiento de las normas "de facto", [1983-D] L.L. 935, 935-46
(1983) (suggesting new approach to treatment of defacto laws and written prior to resto-
ration of democracy).
19. Godoy, [1991-1I] at 458. A de jure government is a constitutional government.
Id. A de jure government "assumes political power through an election or appointment,
in accordance with existing constitutional and legal requirements of form and sub-
stance, and discharges its public functions in conformity with the law. It is, in a word, a
government of laws rather than of force." Puente, supra note 4, at 24.
20. Puente, supra note 4, at 24.
21. Gaggiamo c. Provincia de Santa Fe, [1992-D] L.L. 481, 488 (PetracchiJ., dis-
senting); Nino, supra note 17, at 317.
22. Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 483-84.
23. Aramayo, 306 Fallos 72, 73-74 (1984).
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gentina. This Note concludes that Argentina's existing treat-
ment of de facto laws as legitimate endangers Argentina's transi-
tion to democracy, especially, the creation of strong democratic
institutions.
I. AUTHORITARIANISM AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
ARGENTINA
Argentina's authoritarian tendencies began with its found-
ing as a Spanish colony24 and survived both independence from
Spain25 and the creation of a Constitution. 26 Argentina's author-
itarianism has displayed itself frequently in the past seventy years
through coup d'etats that have led to military governments in
1930,27 1943,28 1955,29 1967,30 and 1976.31 During these past sev-
enty years, Argentina has alternated between constitutional and
authoritarian governments.3 2 Throughout this cycle of authori-
tarian and constitutional governments, Argentina's Supreme
Court developed several standards for the treatment of de facto
laws.33
24. SUSAN CALVERT & PETER CALVERT, ARGENTINA: POLITICAL CULTURE AND STA.
BILITY 14 (1989) [hereinafter CALVERT]; Keith S. Rosenn, The Success of Constitutionalism
in the United States and Its Failure in Latin America: An Explanation, 22 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
L. REv. 1, 22-23 (1990). Spanish explorers first arrived in what is now Argentina in
1516. DAVID RocK, ARGENTINA: 1516-1987, at 8 (1987). It took nearly 70 years before
the Spanish colonies in Argentina were advanced enough to engage in significant inter-
nal and external trade. Id. at 6.
25. CALVERT, supra note 24, at 17.
26. ROCK, supra note 24, at 160.
27. ROBERT A. POTASH, THE ARMY & POLITICS IN ARGENTINA, 1928-1945, at 283
(1969) [hereinafter POTASH (1928-1945)].
28. Id. at 202.
29. ROCK, supra note 24, at 318.
30. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, ARGENTINA: A COUNTRY STUDY 60 (13th ed. 1st.
prtg. 1986) [hereinafter ARMY STUDY]
31. Robert D. Kartheiser, Jr., De Facto Governments, State of Siege Powers, and Freedom
of the Press in Argentina, 18 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 243, 248 (1986).
32. Irwin P. Stotzky, The Fragile Bloom of Democracy, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 105, 113
(1989) (describing history of Argentina as "that of a nation caught in a never ending
cycle between hope for democracy and fear of authoritarian rule").
33. See Nino, supra note 17, at 317-19 (offering analysis of treatment of defacto laws
from 1860's to present); Vera Villalobos, supra note 18, at 462-67 (highlighting stan-
dards for treatment of defacto laws from 1930 to present); Corti, supra note 18, at 970-
73 (discussing treatment of defacto laws from 1930 to 1983).
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A. Early Political History and Judicial Treatment of Authoritarian
Regimes and Constitutional Government: 1516 - 1930.
Spain initially governed Argentina as a colony and in an au-
thoritarian manner.34 Although Argentina gained its indepen-
dence from Spain,35 this independence did not translate initially
into a drastic change in the form of government.3" In 1860, Ar-
gentina united under a constitution" that established the form
of government that has continued until the present.38 As the
nation centralized government 39 and increased its economic
growth,4 ° the Government slowly became more democratic and
constitutional.4" By the early 1900's, Argentina enjoyed a demo-
cratic and constitutional government.
42
1. The Authoritarian Origins of Argentina: 1513 - 1810
The Spanish ruled Argentina and the rest of the Spanish
empire43 in the Americas in a paternalistic manner, 4 ceding lit-
34. CALVERT, supra note 24, at 14; Rosenn, supra note 24, at 22-23 (describing
Spanish rule as "paternalistic and absolutist"). Almost all government officials in the
Spanish colonies were from Spain. Rosenn, supra note 24, at 23. The only forms of
local representation were city and town councils that had little power or autonomy. Id.
35. ARMY STUDY, supra note 30, at 17. The people of Argentina established their
autonomy in 1810 and declared their independence in 1816. Id.
36. CALVERT, supra note 24, at 17; Rosenn, supra note 24, at 21.
37. CONST. ARG.
38. Gisbert H. Flanz, Comparative Notes on the New Constitution of Argentina, in CON-
STITUTIONS, supra note 8, at xi
39. ROCK, supra note 24, at 129-31. By 1870, the disputes among the provinces that
had marred the years following Argentina's independence from Spain, ceased to create
national fragmentation. Id.
40. Id. at 131-52 (detailing economic growth between 1852 and 1890); id. at 163-
69 (detailing economic growth between 1890 and 1913). Between 1861 and 1889, the
combined value of imports and exports rose from 47 million gold pesos to 250 million
gold pesos. Id. at 132. Cultivated land in Argentina expanded from 600,000 hectares in
1872 to 2,500,000 hectares in 1888. Id. at 136. While Argentina only exported 77 met-
ric tons of wheat between 1870 and 1874, that number increased to 782,000 between
1890 and 1894. Id. The value of exports increased fivefold between 1893 and 1913. Id.
at 167. The tonnage of goods that passed through Argentine ports tripled in the two
decades from 1893 to 1913. Id. at 168-69.
41. Id. at 184-90 (discussing expansion of electorate, greater role of political par-
ties, and strengthening of constitutional institutions).
42. ARTHUR P. WHITAKER, ARGENTINA 65 (1965). In 1912, the Argentine Congress
enacted legislation requiring universal male suffrage. ROcK, supra note 24, at 189-90.
The most blatant types of electoral fraud had disappeared by the 1920's. Id. at 190.
43. P.E.H. Hair, Introduction to To DEFEND YOUR EMPIRE AND THE FAITH: ADVICE
OFFERED TO PHILIP, KING OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL 1 (P.E.H. Hair ed. & trans., 1990).
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tle control to the colonists.45 Spanish born officials stationed in
Latin America made most of the managerial and policy decisions
in the colonies.46 Spain discouraged dialogue over policy with
the colonists and the incorporation of local interests into gov-
ernment decisions.47
During this period of authoritarian rule, Spain applied its
laws uniformly in its colonies regardless of regional considera-
tions.4 8 Rather than establishing colonies with stable legal sys-
tems, Spain's foremost concern in its American colonies, includ-.
ing Argentina, was increasing its own wealth. 49 Because of Ar-
gentina's distance from Spain,50 dearth of easily exploitable
mineral resources 5 1 and lack of native populations to force into
labor,52 Argentina received comparatively little attention from its
The Spanish empire in the Americas stretched from Florida to the River Plate region to
tip of the South American continent. Id.
44. CALVERT, supra note 24, at 14. The Spanish Crown reviewed all appeals
originating in its American colonies and controlled the distribution of wealth within
those colonies. Id. The imperial government did not permit its colonies to make many
legal or economic decisions on their own. Id. The Spanish Government controlled the
entrance of foreigners into Argentina, how long they could stay, what property they
could own, and the practice of their religion. H.S. FERNS, THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 23
(1973).
45. CALVERT, supra note 24, at 16.
46. Rosenn, supra note 24, at 23; see generally CALVERT, supra note 24, at 14-20 (illus.-
trating how colonial administrative structures helped entrench authoritarianism).
47. CALVERT, supra note 24, at 14-15.
48. Id. The Spanish Government was:
[U]niversalistic in its application [of laws] to the whole Empire disregarding
the needs or unique conditions of particular areas. Jurists and theologians in
Spain framed laws for colonies they had never visited. [Francisco J.] Moreno
wrote of this .... 'The geographic isolation of the new territories helped, if
anything, to preserve the unreality of Spanish law.' "
Id. (quoting FRANCISCO J. MORENO, LEGITIMACY AND STABILITY IN LATIN AMERICA: A
STUDY OF CHILEAN POLITICAL CULTURE 12 (1969)).
49. CALVERT, supra note 24, at 12; FERNS, supra note 44, at 12. Spain's interest in its
American colonies:
[W] ere controlled with the objective of providing an income for the leading
institution of Spain, The Crown of Castile. For five-sixths of Spanish imperial
history the interest of the Crown was conceived of narrowly in terms of the
royal share in the mining of silver and of the taxes on trade goods bought and
sold within the framework of an economy devoted principally to the produc-
tion of one commodity-silver.
Id.
50. CALVERT, supra note 24, at 15 (noting "isolation of the colonies, especially the
River Plate area, added to the problem of formalism (i.e., law being enacted but not
imposed)").
51. RocK, supra note 24, at 39.
52. Id. at 39-40.
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colonial master.53 Consequently, Spain provided Argentina with
insufficient resources to enforce Spain's universal laws.54 Be-
cause Spain could only partially enforce its own laws55 and these
laws hampered Argentine trade, 56 Argentine merchants resorted
to smuggling to support themselves. As a result, the colonists
evaded the law, demonstrating a disrespect for the legal system
in Argentina.58
2. Independence and the Creation of the Argentine
Constitution: 1810 - 1860
The form and stability of Argentina's government did not
develop immediately following Argentine independence from
Spain.59 Only after internal disorder 60 and provincial rule frag-
mented from the rest of the nation 6 did Argentina found a Con-
stitution6 2 that has served as the framework of its government
53. Id. at 39 (noting that Spanish interest in Americas was limited to "the twin
quests for precious metals and Indians. Because the River Plate had neither in any
abundance, throughout [the colonial] period, it commanded little significance."). It
was only in 1776 that Spain created the viceroyalty of the River Plate of which Buenos
Aires was the capital. Id. at 40. Prior to 1776, the viceroyalty of Peru governed Argen-
tina. Id.
54. CALVERT, supra note 24, at 15.
55. Id.
56. Id.; FERNS, supra note 44, at 16. Until 1778, the Spanish Crown strictly regu-
lated what cities Argentina could trade with. Id. It was only in 1778 that the imperial
government first permitted Argentina to trade directly with any city within the Spanish
empire. Id. After 1778, the imperial government still forbid Argentina to trade with
any port outside of the Spanish Empire. Id. at 17.
57. CALVERT, supra note 24, at 15. Smuggling resulted from Spain's inability to
enforce its laws. Id. In Argentina, "[v] iolation [of Spanish laws] was to be expected if
Spain did not apply coercion to enforce the law, and Spain did not have enough coer-
cive power to apply in such a massive empire." Id. See ROCK, supra note 24, at 30-32, 40-
43 (discussing growth and importance of contraband trade in River Plate towns); see
also FERNS, supra note 44, at 17 (discussing impact of trade liberalization laws as elimi-
nating impetus to smuggle).
58. CALVERT, supra note 24, at 15-17. "[T]he most obvious and direct consequence
of the colonial administrative structure and functioning was the development of un-
workable laws and formalistic attitudes which encouraged evasion and corruption." Id.
at 16-17.
59. Id. at 17.
60. RICARDO LEVENE, A HISTORY OF ARGENTINA 463 (James A. Robertson trans. &
ed., 1963).
61. PETER H. SMITH, POLITICS AND BEEF IN ARGENTINA: PATrERNS OF CHANGE AND
CONFLICT 11 (1969); ROCK, supra note 24, at 101-04. After Argentina's independence,
regional loyalties took precedent over national interests. SMITH, supra, at 11.
62. CONST. ARG.
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until the present day.6 3 The Constitution defines a federal
framework of government ' between the provinces 65 of Argen-
tina and the Federal Government.66 The Federal Government
includes an Executive Branch headed by a president,67 a Legisla-
tive Branch 68 composed of a Chamber of Deputies of the Na-
tion6 9 and a Senate,7" and a Judicial Branch7" with its highest
court the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation ("Supreme
Court" or "Court").72 In addition to the framework of govern-.
ment, the Argentine Constitution establishes constitutional guar-
antees for individuals.7"
a. Independence
Argentina began its independence movement from Spain in
18101 and declared its independence in 1816. 71 The overthrow
of the colonial power did not destroy the authoritarian frame-
work of government in Argentina.7 6  Most of the Argentine
63. Kartheiser, supra note 31, at 244.
64. CONST. ARC. The Constitution states that the "Argentine Nation adopts for its
government the federal, republican, representative form as established by the present
Constitution." Id. art. 1.
65. Cristina Bonasegna, Buenos Aires Law puts Falklands in Argentine State, DAILY TEL,.
EGRAPH, Apr. 27, 1990, at 13. The Argentine nation is divided into provinces. Id.
66. CONST. ARG. art. 1.
67. Id. arts. 87-107. Articles 87 to 107 of the Argentine Constitution enumerate
the powers of the Executive Branch. Id.
68. Id. arts. 44-86. Articles 44 to 86 of the Argentine Constitution describe the
powers of the Legislative Branch. Id.
69. Id. art. 44. Article 44 of the Constitution declares, "[a] Congress consisting of
two Chambers, one of Deputies of the nation and the other of Senators of the Provinces
and the City of Buenos Aires, is vested with the Legislative Power of the Nation." Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. arts. 108-19. Articles 108 to 119 detail the nature and competence of the
Judicial Branch. Id.
72. Id. art. 108. Article 108 of the Constitution states, "[t]he Judicial Power of the
Nation shall be vested in a Supreme Court ofJustice." Id.
73. Id. arts. 1-43. The Constitution guarantees, amongst other liberties, the right
to work, free speech, free religion, and the right to learn. Id. art. 14.
74. ARmy STUDY, supra note 30, at 16-17. Napoleon's removal of the Spanish King
in 1808 catalyzed the independence movement. Id. The Argentines who overthrew the
colonial powers in Buenos Aires initially intended to rule until the King returned to the
Spanish throne. CALVERT, supra note 24, at 17.
75. ARw STUDY, supra note 30, at 17.
76. CALVERT, supra note 24, at 17-18. Independence changed neither the class
structure nor the position of the church in government. Id. at 18. Among the traits
carried over into post-independence Argentina were the reliance on individuals, rather
than parties, for leadership, the extraction of forced loans from political opponents,
and provincial allegiances that discouraged compromise with opposition. Id. at 38-40.
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elite77 responsible for independence were not concerned with
implementing social changes, 78 but wanted to seize control of
government for their own benefit.79 Two early attempts to agree
upon the structure of government in written constitutions failed
in the face of internal struggles between the Federalists, °8 pro-
vincial forces that wanted to create a federation, 81 and
Unitarist 82 forces centered in Buenos Aires that wanted a repub-
lic.83 These failures resulted in a decentralized government84
characterized by the regional authoritarian rule of caudillos8 5
All the Argentine provinces, excluding Buenos Aires,86 at-
77. FERNS, supra note 44, at 14. The elites in colonial Argentina were first
merchants and then the owners of vast tracts of land. Id. The Argentine elites sought
to consolidate the monopoly of power. RocK, supra note 24, at 38. The monopolies of
the Argentine elites existed in land ownership, trade, smuggling, and mule breeding.
Id. at 117. The Argentine elites tended to be urban. Id.
78. CALVERT, supra note 24, at 17.
79. Id. at 17. One of the benefits that the elite sought was the power, prestige, and
profit that came with the filling of governmental posts previously reserved for those
born in Spain. Id. This concept applies to Latin America as a whole. Rosenn, supra
note 24, at 21-22. Land based elites initiated the independence movements not as a
means to overturn the traditional economic and social orders, but rather as a means to
increase their betterment from those structures. Id.
80. ARMY STUDY, supra note 30, at 21. The Federalists were a political force aligned
with provincial leaders who sought greater autonomy for the individual provinces and
wanted to create a loose federation that would unite them. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 22. The Unitarists base of support was in Buenos Aires. Id. The
Unitarists sought greater and less restrictive trade. ROCK, supra note 24, at 36. The
Unitarists advocated "administrative and political centralism." Id.
83. Carlos S. Nino, The Debate Over Constitutional Reform in Latin America, 16 FORD-
HAM INT'L LJ. 635, 639 (1993) [hereinafter Constitutional Reform]. The exclusion of
Federalist concerns from both the Constitution of 1819 and the Constitution of 1824
created deep divisions in Argentina. Id.; RoCK, supra note 24, at 93-94. The Constitu-
tion of 1819 fell victim to disagreements between the provinces. Id.; Forces represent-
ing the Province of Buenos Aires mounted a failed invasion of the Province of Santa Fe
in an attempt to force the Constitution of 1819 upon the local government of Santa Fe.
Id. The Constitution of 1826 collapsed in the face of disputes between the provinces.
Id. at 101-04. In 1828,Juan Manuel de Rosas emerged from the provincial disputes as a
national dictator based in Buenos Aires, a position that he would effectively hold until
1852. Id. at 103-04.
84. SMITH, supra note 61, at 121. During this period, the Argentine population's
resources and "primary loyalties were devoted to the provinces rather than the Repub-
lic." Id. There was no unified government that could exert control over the entire
nation. Id.
85. RoCK, supra note 24, at 101-04. A caudillo is the term used for any local
strongman who has a private military and rules by force. Id. at 93. Caudillos are
"[p]rovincial warlords." Id.
86. Id. at 121-22 The Unitarists in Buenos Aires felt excluded from the Constitu-
tion of 1853. Id. Among other things, they were concerned over the status of the city of
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tempted to create a national government by ratifying the Consti-
tution of 1853.87 Problems immediately followed the founding
of the Constitution of 1853 ("Argentine Constitution" or "Con-
stitution").88 Buenos Aires resisted incorporation with the rest
of the provinces and did not adopt the Constitution until 1860,
shortly before the battle of Pav6n.8 9 At the Battle of Pav6n in
1861,90 the province of Buenos Aires, under General Mitre9" de-
feated the Federalist forces.92 Following the -battle of Pav6n,
General Mitre set up a defacto government that lasted from 1861
until his election as president in 1862."3
b. The Constitution
The founders94 of the Argentine Constitution95 structured it
Buenos Aires and the revenue generated from its port. ARMY STUDY, supra note 30, at
31.
87. ROCK, supra note 24, at 121. The Government of Buenos Aires refused to par-
ticipate in the planning of the new Constitution. ARMY STUDY, supra note 30, at 30.
88. ROCK, supra note 24, at 121.
89. ARMY STUDY, supra note 30, at 31. To entice Buenos Aires to ratify the Constitu-
tion of 1853, the other provinces made concessions such as granting a special status to
the city of Buenos Aires and delaying the date customs' revenue collected at the port in
Buenos Aires became domain of the national government. Id.
90. LEVENE, supra note 60, at 463. The Battle of Pav6n was the ultimate conflict
between Unitarist and Federalist forces in Argentina. Id.
91. Id. at 459. General Bartolom6 Mitre was the Minister of War of the Province of
Buenos Aires during the period when it resisted adoption of the Constitution of 1853.
Id. In the late 1850's, Mitre also became the Governor of the Province of Buenos Aires.
Id. at 460-61
92. ARMY STUDY, supra note 30, at 33.
93. Id.; ROCK, supra note 24, at 125; see LEVENE, supra note 60, at 464-67 (discussing
Mitre Government between 1861 and 1862).
94. ARMY STUDY, supra note 30, at 30. In 1852, the Federalist forces that defeated
the caudilloJuan Manuel de Rosas organized a Constitutional Constituent Assembly. Id.
The most influential delegate was Juan Bautista Aberdi. Id.; Segundo V. Linares
Quintana, Comparison of the Constitutional Basis of the United States and Argentine Political
Systems, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 641, 642 (1949).
95. CONST. ARG. The Constitutional Constituent Assembly began in 1852. ARMY
STUDY, supra note 30, at 30. The delegates from all the provinces but Buenos Aires
ratified the Constitution at the Constitutional Constituent Assembly of 1853. Linares
Quintana, supra note 94, at 642. It was not until the other provinces agreed to some
constitutional modifications in 1860, that Buenos Aires adopted the Constitution of
1853. ARMY STUDY, supra note 30, at 31; Alberto F. Garay, Federalism, theJudiciay, and
Constitutional Adjudication in Argentina: A Comparison with the U.S. Constitutional Model, 22
U. Mits m INTER-AM. L. REv. 161,162 n.2 (1991). To avoid confusion about the different
dates involved, many scholars refer to the Argentine Constitution as the 1853-60 Consti-
tution. Id.
1588 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19:1578
after the U.S. Constitution.96 Like the U.S. Constitution, 97 the
Argentine Constitution establishes the National Government
within a federal framework.98 A central principle of both the
U.S. and Argentine frameworks is the separation of powers99 be-
tween the different federal branches of government. 00 While
the basic frameworks of the U.S. and Argentine constitutions are
the same, the details differ."0 ' Argentina's Federal Government
is composed of three primary branches,10 2  an Executive
Branch 0 3 led by the president,10 4 a Legislative Branch 0 5 com-
posed of a Senate 10 6 and a Chamber of Deputies of the Na-
96. Rosenn, supra note 24, at 24; Linares Quintana, supra note 94, at 643, 645;
Garay, supra note 95, at 161.
97. Linares Quintana, supra note 94, at 645.
98. CONST. ARc. art. 1; see Linares Quintana, supra note 94, at 649-54 (describing
relation between Federal Government and provinces). Argentina presently has 23 prov-
inces. Bonasegna, supra note 65, at 13. Like the states in the United States, the prov-
inces have surrendered some of their sovereignty to the federal government. Linares
Quintana, supra note 94, at 650; see CONST. ARG. arts. 77, 99 (listing powers granted to
Federal Government). The Constitution states that the "Provinces retain all powers not
delegated by the Constitution to the Federal Government and those expressly reserved
by special covenants at the time of their incorporation." CONST. ARG. art. 121.
99. GERMAN BIDART CAMPOS, TRATADO ELEMENTAL DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL
ARGENTINO 17 (1993) [hereinafter DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL]. The separation of pow-
ers principle calls for different branches of government to have different governmental
functions as a means of ensuring that no one branch can assume control over the other
branches and, thus, all state functions. Id.
100. Id.; GABRIEL NEGRETTO, EL PROBLEMA DE LA EMERGENCIA EN EL SISTEMA CONSTI-
TUCIONAL 54 (1994); Linares Quintana, supra note 94, at 654 (calling principle of sepa-
ration of powers "backbone" of U.S. and Argentine Constitutions).
101. Liniares Quintana, supra note 94, at 643, 645; Garay, supra note 95, at 161.
102. CONST. AG. art. 120. The Constituent Assembly of 1994 added a fourth in-
dependent branch by separating the office of the Public Ministry from the other
branches. CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 8, at xii.
103. CONST. ARG. arts. 87-107 (establishing Executive Power). The Executive
Branch traditionally has had preeminence over the other two branches. Linares
Quintana, supra note 94, at 654; see Constitutional Reform, supra note 83, at 640-41 (dis-
cussing "hyper-presidentialism" in Argentine political structure).
104. CONST. ARO. art. 87; see id. art. 99 (outlining presidential powers). The presi-
dent is elected by the direct vote of the eligible Argentine population. Id. art. 94. The
President serves a four-year term and may be consecutively re-elected to office once. Id.
art. 90. Until 1994, the president served a six-year term, but was not eligible for consec-
utive re-election. CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 8, at xii.
105. CONST. ARG. arts. 44-86 (detailing powers of Legislative Branch). Tradition-
ally, the Legislative Branch has not been a powerful branch of government. Linares
Quintana, supra note 94, at 655-56. The strength of the Executive Branch came at the
expense of the Legislative Branch. Id.
106. CONST. ARG. art. 44. The Senate is composed of three senators from each
province, one of whom must be from the political party receiving the second highest
percentage of the vote. Id. art. 54. Senators sit for a term of six years. Id. art 55.
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tion, "' and a Judicial °8 Branch with the Supreme Court of Jus-
tice as its highest court.1" 9 The Argentine Constitution also re-
stricts the power of the Argentine Government by enumerating
guarantees against governmental abuse of individuals." 0
i. The Executive Branch
The Argentine Constitution vests the executive"' with an
array of powers. 1 2 The president is the commander-in-chief of
the nation's armed forces.1 13 The president nominates Supreme
CourtJustices114 for the Senate's confirmation."' The president
may approve 1 6 or veto a congressional bill. 1 7 The president ex-
ecutes legislation.1 8 During exceptional circumstances, 19 the
president is able to enact legislation through decrees of "urgency
and necessity." 120 The president may also declare Federal inter-
vention in a province, allowing the Federal Government to de-
107. Id. art. 44. The number of deputies that each province sends is contingent
upon that province's population. Id. art. 45. The term of the deputies is for four years.
Id. art. 50.
108. Id. arts. 108-19 (enumerating Judicial Power).
109. Id. The Supreme Court is the "guardian and final and definitive interpreter
of the Constitution." Linares Quintana, supra note 94, at 656. The members of the
Supreme Court are Supreme Court Justices. CONST. ARG. art. 110.
110. CONST. ARc. arts. 1-43 (listing constitutional guarantees). Among the guaran-
tees in the Constitution are freedom of speech, the right to unionize and strike, free-
dom of religion, and the right to own property. Id.
111. Id. arts. 87-107. Articles 87 to 107 establishes the Executive Branch and enu-
merate its authority to execute the law and create government policy. Id. The presi-
dent holds the powers vested to the Executive Branch. Id. art. 87.
112. Linares Quintana, supra note 94, at 665.
113. CONST. ARG. art. 99, cl. 12.
114. Id. art. 99, cl. 4.
115. Id. The president's nominees for the Supreme Court are contingent upon a
two-thirds majority vote of the Senate. Id.
116. Id. art. 78.
117. Id. art. 80. A bill that the executive rejects returns to Congress. Id. art. 83.
The legislature may override the executive by a two-thirds majority. Id.
118. Id. art. 99, cl. 2.
119. Id. art. 99, cl. 3. Presidents have declared the existence of exceptional cir-
cumstances in an array of situations including internal security problems, economic
crises, the need for new national identification documents, and Bolivia's shortage of
cement. HoRAcio VERBITSKY, HACER LA CORTE 164-65 (1993).
120. CONST. ARG. art. 99. cl. 3. The Constitution states:
Under penalty of the same being absolutely and irredeemably void, the
Executive Power may in no case make dispositions of a legislative character.
Only when exceptional circumstances make it impossible to follow the
regular arrangements which this Constitution provides for passing laws and
when it is not a matter of rules regulating penal, tax, or electoral matters or
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pose provincial governments and assumes their responsibilities
and powers.1 2 ' The president may declare a state of emergency
in the entire nation or certain provinces, 22 during which time
the government may suspend constitutional guarantees. 123
ii. The Legislative Branch
The Argentine legislature 12 4 is composed of a Senate125 and
a Chamber of Deputies. 126 While in certain exceptional circum-
stances the executive enacts legislation by decree, 12 7 the legisla-
ture enacts most laws.128 By a two-thirds majority, Congress may
call a Constituent Assembly to reform all or part of the Constitu-
tion. 12 9 Also by a two-thirds majority, the Senate may approve of
the president's nomination of a Supreme Court Justice, 13  and
the system of political parties, may he dictate decrees for reasons of necessity
and urgency.
Id. The Constitutional Constituent Assembly of 1994 added the power to legislate
by decree in situations of urgency and necessity to the Constitution. CONsTrrUTIONS,
supra note 8, at 49. Presidents since the founding of the Constitution, however, have
used executive decrees to legislate. VERBITSKY, supra note 119, at 164 . As recently as
1990, the Supreme Court upheld the use of such decrees. Peralta c. Estado Nacional,
[1991-C] L.L. 173, 186 (1990).
121. CONST. ARG. art. 99, cl. 20; Garro, supra note 15, at 88 (discussing president
intervening in provinces).
122. Id. art. 99, cl. 16. Article 99, clause 16, sets forth the conditions under which
the president may declare a state of siege. Id. Article 99, clause 16, states that, with the
consent of the Senate, the president may declare "one or more districts of the Nation in
a state of siege for a limited period in the event of a foreign attack. In the event of
internal disorder, he has this power only when Congress is in recess, since this is a
power belonging to that body." Id.
123. Id. art. 23. Article 23 states, "[iln the event of internal disorder or foreign
attack endangering the operation of this Constitution and of the authorities created
thereby, the Province or territory in which the disturbance of order exists shall be de-
clared in a state of siege and the constitutional guarantees shall be suspended therein."
Id.
124. Id. arts. 44-86.
125. Id. art. 44; see supra note 106 (describing nature of Senate).
126. CONsT. ARG. art 44; see supra note 107 (describing nature of deputies).
127. CONST. ARG. art. 99, cl. 3; see supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text
(describing executive legislation by decree).
128. CONST. ARc. arts. 77-83. Article 77 enumerates the areas in which Congress
may legislate. Id. art. 77. A bill originates in either the Senate or the Chamber of
Deputies. Id. After being approved by a simple majority of both Chambers of Con-
gress, Congress sends the bill for presidential approval. Id. art. 78. If the president
approves the bill, it becomes law. Id. If the president rejects the bill, it returns to
Congress where both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies may override the presi-
dent by a two-thirds majority in each Chamber. Id. art. 83.
129. Id. art. 30.
130. Id. art. 99, cl. 4.
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the Senate may remove from office the president1 31 or Supreme
Court Justices132 who the Chamber of Deputies have impeached
for malfeasance or a common crime.13 3
iii. The Judicial Branch
Argentina's constitutional founders based the Argentine ju-
dicial system upon the Anglo-American judicial tradition."5 4 The
head of the judiciary is the Supreme Court,13 5 which has inferior
courts beneath it.13 6 The Supreme Court possesses the power of
judicial review,1 37 but only in judicial cases, controversies, and
suits between parties.13 8 The precedent of these rulings influ.-
ences later cases before the Supreme Court1 3 9 and the lower
courts. 14 0 A case of a political nature 141 is non-justiciable."'4
131. Id. arts. 59-60.
132. Id.
133. Id. art. 53. The Chamber of Deputies may only impeach the president or a
Supreme Court Justice by a two-thirds majority. Id.
134. Linares Quintana, supra note 94, at 643. In the 1860's and 1870's, as a recog-
nition of the influence of the U.S. legal system in Argentina, Congress ordered the
translation into Spanish of books on U.S. constitutional law. Garay, supra note 95, at
176 n.100.
135. See CONST. ARc. art. 108 (establishing Supreme Court possessing Argentina's
judicial power); Id. arts. 108-19 (describing nature and competence ofjudicial branch).
136. See id. art. 108 (allowing Congress to create federal courts inferior to Supreme
Court).
137. Nino, supra note 17, at 316. The Supreme Court has the power of judicial
review, the authority to determine whether a piece of legislation exceeds the constitu-
tional powers of Congress or the president. Id. While the power of judicial review is
not enumerated in the Constitution, it has grown out of Supreme Court case law. Id.;
Rios, 1 Fallos 36, 36 (1863) (finding president may not ascribe judicial functions to ad-
ministrators); Calavete, 1 Fallos 345, 349 (1864) (asserting Supreme Court is final inter-
preter of Constitution); Sojo, 32 Fallos 125, 141 (1887) (holding congressional legisla-
tion to be unconstitutional); La Municipalidad de la Capital c. Elortondo, 33 Fallos 162,
184 (1888) (establishing Supreme Court's duty to find legislation unconstitutional if
outside of Constitution's mandate).
138. Irizarry y Puente, supra note 4, at 33-34. The Supreme Court releases
Acordadas, declarations and comments that have no binding legal effect. Id.
139. Garay, supra note 95, at 187-201; Alejandro M. Garro, Eficacia y autoridad del
precedente constitucional en america latina: las lecciones del derecho comparado, 20 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. Rav. 480, 486 (1989) [hereinafter Precedente constitucional].
140. Garay, supra note 95, at 187-201; Precedente constitucional, supra note 139, at
486.
141. Alejandro M. Garro, The Role of the ArgentineJudiciary in the Transition to Democ-
racy, 4 HuM. RTS. L.J. 311, 327 (1983) [hereinafter ArgentineJudiciary]. A political ques-
tion is one that would bring two branches of government into conflict. Id. Political
questions are questions "which courts will refuse to take cognizance, or to decide, on
account of their purely political character or because their determination would involve
an encroachment upon the executive or legislative powers." BLACK, supra note 7, at
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While the Constitution does not establish the number ofJustices,
it does guarantee Justices life tenure which is revocable by the
Senate only for malfeasance or criminal conduct.'4
iv. Constitutional Guarantees
The Federal Government may not intrude upon liberties
guaranteed by the Argentine Constitution.'44 Amongst these lib-
erties are freedom of the press,4 5 the right to unionize and
strike,' 46 the inviolability of the home, 4 7 the right to trial in
front of ajudge, 148 and the right to property,149 including vested
rights. 5 ' The State, however, may temporarily suspended some
1158. SeeJulio Oyharante, Cuestiones nojusticiables, in TEMAS DE CASACI6N V RECURSOS
EXTRAORDINARIOS 143, 143-54 (1982).
142. Arlandini, 208 Fallos 184, 186 (1947); Acordada sobre reconocimiento del
Gobierno surgido de )a Revoluci6n del 4 deJunio de 1943, 196 Fallos at 6-7 (1943);
Acordada sobre reconocimiento del Gobierno Provincial de la Naci6n, 158 Fallos at
290, 291 (1930); GERMAN J. BIDART CAMPOS, THE ARGENTINE SUPREME COURT: THE
COURT OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES 10 (1982).
143. CONST. ARC. art. 110.
144. Id. arts. 1-43. Articles 1 through 43 enumerate constitutionally guaranteed
liberties. Id.; see Linares Quintana, supra note 94, at 645-49 (summarizing constitu-
tional guarantees).
145. CONST. ARG. art. 14. Article 14 enumerates several rights, including rights:
[Of] working in and practicing any lawful industry; of navigating and trading;
of petitioning the authorities; of entering, remaining in, travelling through
and leaving Argentine territory; of publishing their ideas through the press
without previous censorship; of using and disposing of their property; of asso-
ciating for useful purposes; of freely professing their religion; of teaching and
learning.
Id.
146. Id. art. 14 bis.
147. Id. art. 18.
148. Id. (stating that "defense, by trial, of the person and of rights is inviolable").
149. Id. art. 17. Article 17 establishes that property is "inviolable, and no inhabit-
ant of the nation can be deprived thereof except by virtue of a sentence founded on
law. Expropriation for reasons of public utility must be authorized by law and previ-
ously compensated." Id.
150. BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 142, at 52. Vested rights are rights to property
arising from judgements, laws, contracts, or administrative rights. Id. A vested right is
a right granted in law and "of which an individual could not be deprived without injus-
tice, or of which he could not bejustiy deprived otherwise than by the established meth-
ods of procedure and for the public welfare." BLACK, supra note 7, at 1564.
The Supreme Court has interpreted Article 17 as a guarantee to retain a vested
right when Congress repeals the law granting it. Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 483 (find-
ing that right vested by law is protected under Article 17 of Constitution); Horta c.
Harguindeguy, 137 Fallos 47, 61 (1922) (stating "ni el legislador ni eljuez pueden, en
virtud de una ley nueva o de su interpretaci6n arrebatar o alterar un derecho patrimo-
nial adquirido al amparo de la legislaci6n anterior." ["neither legislator nor judge can,
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of these constitutional guarantees1 5 1 during a state of siege. 15 2
3. Constitutional Rule: 1861 - 1930
By 1860, every province had ratified the Argentine Constitu-
tion. 153 National adoption of the Constitution, however, did not
immediately create national unity.1 54 Rather, the fragmentation
of the provinces from the National Government 55 did not end
until the 1880's, when Argentina was firmly under the control of
a stable centralized government.1 56
by a new law or decision, divest one of a property right once it has been acquired under
previous legislation."]) (translation in BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 142, at 520).
151. CONST. ARc. art. 23. All guarantees can be suspended save those that lead to
the unconstitutional arrest or forced internal transport of citizens, unless the Govern-
ment first gives them the opportunity to leave the nation. Id.
152. Id. art. 23; see supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text (describing how Ex-
ecutive or Congress declares state of siege). A state of siege is an emergency provision
that reduces the liberties that the state must respect. Kartheiser, supra note 31, at 245,
251-52. Between 1930 and 1983 there were 15 states of siege, the longest of which
lasted from 1974 to 1983. Id. at 252 n.37.
The Argentine Supreme Court defined the scope, object, and length of states of
siege in Granada. Granada, [1986-B] L.L. 221, 245-49 (1985). The Court's interpreta-
tion of the scope, object and length of a state of siege in Granada was narrow.
Kartheiser, supra note 31, at 252. The U.S. Supreme Court has approved suspension of
constitutional guarantees, most notably President Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus
during the U.S. Civil War. Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 125 (1866).
153. ARMY STUDY, supra note 30, at 31. All the provinces except Buenos Aires rati-
fied the Constitution in 1853. Id.; RoCK, supra note 24, at 121. The Province of Buenos
Aires was the last province to adopt the Constitution. Id. at 120.
154. YSABEL F. RENNIE, THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 110-20 (1945). The battle of
Pav6n occurred after every province ratified the Constitution. ARMY STUDY, supra note
30, at 31. For several years after the battle of Pav6n, there was a rebellion in the north-
ern provinces of Argentina. RENNIE, supra, at 110. Caudillos still controlled many prov-
inces, including a caudillo from the province of La Rioja who attacked other provinces.
Id. President Mitre wrote that bandits had taken over Province of La Rioja and that the
government there no longer existed. Id. at 112. In 1874. the national army invaded the
province of Entre Rios and fought against the militia of Entre Rios in order to wrest
control of the province from a regional caudillo. Id. at 118.
155. SMITH, supra note 61, at 11. The provincial powers often ignored the national
laws. Id. The national government often resorted to force to implement its control
over provinces. RocK, supra note 24, at 129. The Federal Government used force to
quell rebellions in northern provinces. RENNIE, supra note 154, at 110. In 1874, a fed-
eral army from Buenos Aires invaded the province of Entre Rios to quash the rule of a
provincial leader. Id. at 118. Federal soldiers assassinated a caudiUo from the province
La Rioja who attacked neighboring provinces and refused to cooperate with the Federal
Government. Id. at 111-14.
156. RocK, supra note 24, at 129. By the 1880's, caudillos ceased to be able to
disregard national law. Id. By 1880, the presence of the caudillos had diminished to
such a degree that their strength now lay in controlling regional elections rather than
the regions outright. Id.
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While the four decades following the founding of the Con-
stitution witnessed the crystallization of the Argentine state,1 57
economic expansion,158 and social change," 9 little change oc-
curred in terms of participatory democracy. 6 ° . This gradually
changed as the ruling Conservative party' 6' replaced the fraudu-
lent elections in the 1890's62 with universal laws requiring male
suffrage for citizens by 1912,161 in an attempt to consolidate
political divisions within the Conservative party and to coopt and
preempt opposition."' The result changed not only how the
elections were held 65 but also who won them. 66 In the years
between 1916 and 1930, non-fraudulently elected Radical
Party 1 67 presidents governed Argentina. 16
157. Id. By 1870, the political struggle between Federalists and Unitarists was over.
Id. The Unitarist's goal of creating a strong centralized government prevailed over the
Federalists goal of a loose coalition with greater autonomy for the provinces. Id.
158. Id. at 131-52 (detailing economic growth between 1852 and 1890); FERNS,
supra note 44, at 54. In the 20 years from 1870 to 1890, the total length of Argentine
railway track in kilometers increased from 836 to 3300. Id. at 55. During this same
period exports of wheat increased from 9 tons a year to 327,894 tons, wool from 6.8
million pesos to 35.5 million, and animal hide from 10.3 million pesos to 20 million.
Id. at 67. The value of Argentine exports increased form under 100 million gold pesos
in 1893 to over 500 million gold pesos in 1913. ROCK, supra note 24, at 167.
159. ROCK, supra note 24, at 131. During this period, Argentina became a more
educated, urban, and wealthy nation. Id. at 118, 143. In 1850, Argentina had an esti-
mated population of a little under one million. FERNS, supra note 44, at 38. By 1890,
Argentina's population had risen to 3.4 million. ROCK, supra note 24, at 153. During
this period, Argentina experienced its first major wave of immigration with a net immi-
gration of over 1.1 million people between 1870 and 1890. Id.
160. RocK, supra note 24, at 160.
161. ARMY STUDY, supra note 30, at 216. The Conservative Party governed Argen-
tina from the founding of the Constitution until 1916. Id. The Conservatives stressed
"free trade, export led growth, openness to foreign investment, and a further integra-
tion into the global trade and monetary system" while opposing "government interven-
tion in the economy." Id. at 216-17. The Conservative Party was the party of the upper-
class with strong ties to Argentina's agrarian interests. Carlos H. Waisman, The Legitima-
tion of Democracy Under Adverse Conditions: The Case of Argentina, in LIBERAL DEMOCRACY,
supra note 13, at 97, 98.
162. RocK, supra note 24, at 184. Among the problems hampering open elections
were that only a portion of the population was enfranchised and that local bosses intim-
idated opposition and bribed voters. Id.
163. Id. at 189-90.
164. Id. at 188-90.
165. Id. at 190. In addition to the new election laws doubling voter turnout, "the
worst kinds of political skulduggery were banished." Id.
166. WHITAKER, supra note 42, at 65.
167. AtMy ST'UD, supra note 30, at 218. The Radical Party began in the 1890's as a
political party devoted to breaking up the oligarchical rule of the Conservatives. Id.
The Radical Party has traditionally been the party of the middle-class. WHITAKER, supra
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4. First Judicial Treatment of De Facto laws
The Argentine Supreme Court first addressed the issue of de
facto laws in Martinez y Otero.169  Baldomero Martinez sued for
damages on a law that Mitre's de facto Government 170 enacted
claiming that Mitre's Government was not constitutionally com-
petent to enact binding laws. 71 The Court recognized the valid-.
ity of the laws of Mitre's Government, emphasizing the nation's
grave and unstable political situation and noting that Mitre exer-
cised national power and had the consent of the people in his
victory at Pav6n.' 72 The Court's decision to ascribe validity to
laws that had their origin outside of the Constitution became
known as the defacto doctrine.1 73
B. Historical Cycle of De Facto Regimes and Constitutional
Government.
Since 1930, Argentina has been caught in a cycle of military
juntas followed by civilian governments. 174 Between 1930 and
1983, both military and civilian governments constrained the
participation of political parties.' 75  The military governments,
however, also infringed upon constitutional and democratic in-
note 42, at 9. See generally ARMY STUDY, supra note 30, at 217-20 (discussing Radical Party
from its inception to 1985).
168. WHITAKER, supra note 42, at 48-49.
169. Martinez y Otero, 2 Fallos 127, 142-43 (1865).
170. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (describing Mitre's defacto govern-
ment).
171. Martinez y Otero, 2 Fallos at 142.
172. Id.; see supra note 90-92 and accompanying text (presenting General Mitre's
victory at Pav6n). The Court stated that Mitre was a:
[A]utoridad competente para conocer y decidir en esa clase de asuntos, por
ser quien ejercia provisoriamente todos los poderes nacionales, despues de la
Batalla de Pavon, con el derecho de la revolucion triunfante y asentida por los
pueblos, y en virtud de los graves deberes que la victoria le imponia.
Martinez y Otero, 2 Fallos at 142-43 [[C]ompetent authority to understand and decide
this type of matter, because he was the person who provisionally exercised all of the
national powers after the Battle of Pav6n, with the right of the triumphant revolution,
assented to by the people, and in virtue of the grave duties that the victory imposed
upon him.] (translation by Note author).
173. Nino, supra note 17, at 317-18.
174. Stotzky, supra note 32, at 109-14. The longest military government lasted
from 1976 to 1983. Id. at 111-12. The last shift in government was from the military to
a democracy in 1983. Id. at 113-14.
175. Edward C. Epstein, Democracy in Arentina, in THE NEw ARGENTINE DEMOCRACY
3, 4-13 (Edward C. Epstein ed., 1992) [hereinafter NEw DEMOCRACv].
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stitutions 176 as well as human rights. 17 7 The constraints on polit-
ical power178 and the weakness of constitutional and political in-
stitutions179 created a political instability18 ° in Argentina that is
only now recuperating.18'
1. Uriburu's Coup: 1930 - 1932
In 1930, General Uriburu 8 2 staged a coup that interrupted
the existing constitutional rule. 183 The military supported the
coup because of the nation's economic crisis resulting from
the global depression184 and because of growing dissatisfaction
with the democratically elected President. 185  The Argentine
Supreme Court, which the military allowed to continue operat-
ing with its pre-coup Justices,186 approved of the Uriburu Gov-
ernment and declared it constitutional.1 87 The Supreme Court
176. Monica Peralta-Ramos, Toward an Analysis of the Structural Basis of Coercion in
Argentina: The Behavior of the Major Fractions of the Bourgeoisie, 1976-1983, in LIBERAL D&
MOCRACY, supra note 13, at 39, 46-47; Carlos S. Nino, Transition to Democracy, Corporatism
and Constitutional Reform in Latin America, 44 U. MtAMI L. REv. 129, 130 (1989) [herein-
after Corporatism].
177. ROCK, supra note 24, at 334-37 (describing murder, torture, and detainment
of political opponents of defacto Government of 1955 to 1958); COMISI6N NACTIONAL
SOBRE LA DESPERACI6N DE PERSONAS, NUNCA MAS 1-6 (1986) [hereinafter NUNCA MAS]
(summarizing military's use of violence during 1976-83 defacto Government).
178. Peralta-Ramos, supra 176, at 46-47. As a general rule, from 1930 to 1983,
political groups in Argentina that have exercised control have been unable to build
political parties with enough popular support to obtain control of government demo-
cratically. Id. These groups resorted to military coups, fraudulent elections, and polit-
ical pressure to achieve and maintain power. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 47. With the lack of strong political and constitutional institutions, "the
accumulation of economic and political demands did not find proper expression within
the existing institutional channels. The result was the progressive crisis of institutional
legitimacy that shook the country." Id.
181. Alfonsin, supra note 2, at 41-42; Garro, supra note 15, at 7-8.
182. RENNIE, supra note 154, at 222-23. GeneralJos F61ix Uriburu was a military
officer who, in his youth, associated himself with the Radical party, but by the time of
the coup had developed Conservative connections. Id.
183. POTASH (1928-1945), supra note 27, at 283. The defacto Government of 1930
left all the Supreme Courtjustices in their posts. Vera Villalobos, supra note 18, at 462.
The de facto Government also appointed mostly civilians to cabinet posts, kept some
provincial governments intact, and remained in power for less than a year and a half.
POTASH (1928-1945), supra note 27, at 55-56.
184. Stotzky, supra note 32, at 110.
185. ARMY STUDY, supra note 30, at 37-38.
186. JONATHAN M. MILLER ET AL., CONSTITUCI6N Y PODER POLTICO 828 (1987).
Although the Supreme CourtJustices remained in their posts, the e facto Government
removed lower court judges. Id.
187. 1930 Acordada, 158 Fallos at 290-91.
DE FACTO LAWS !N ARGENTINA
declared that the new military Government was constitutional
because it vowed to uphold the Constitution and it had the will
and power to secure national peace. 188 A decline in Uriburu's
health, as well as in military and public support for his govern-
ment, led to elections in 1931 and the transfer of power to a
civilian government in 1932.19
2. Civilian Government: 1932 - 1943
The following decade of civilian rule appeased neither the
Conservative nor Radical Parties.19 ° The fraudulent electoral vic-
tories of Conservative presidential candidates frustrated the op-
position.1 91 Conservatives, on the other hand, believed that.
their control was diminishing over the selection of presidential
candidates and that the Radicals and other opposition parties
were disproportionately influential in Congress.1 92  The prece-
dent of General Uriburu's de facto Government and the subse-
quent electoral fraud, created an atmosphere in which both
Radicals and Conservatives sought military force to achieve goals
that they could not attain through the democratic system. 93
The military was becoming accustomed to its role in national
politics.194 These factors combined to produce a coup d'etat in
1943 by Nationalist forces.1 95
3. Nationalist De Facto Regime: 1943 - 1946
In 1943, the military viewed its coup as part of its duty to
188. Id.
189. ARMY STUDY, supra note 30, at 48; POTASH (1928-1945), supra note 27, at 60.
190. ROCK, supra 24, at 216-17.
191. ARMY STUDY, supra note 30, at 47-50; POTASH (1928-1945), supra note 27, at
74, 94. The Radical Party was not represented in the 1931 elections, and there was
fraud in the 1937 presidential election and all congressional elections between 1930
and 1943. ARMy STUDY, supra note 30, at 47-50; POTASH (1928-1945), supra note 27, at
74, 94.
192. ARMY STUDY, supra note 30, at 50-51.
193. POTASH (1928-1945), supra note 27, at 283. Conservatives relied on the mili-
tary to maintain their hold on government while Radicals and nationalist elements
sought military intervention as a means of obtaining control of the State. Id.
194. Id. at 284.
195. Id. at 283-85. The Nationalists tended to favor a "diversification of trade pat-
terns as a supplement to agricultural exports, the expansion of state control over vital
sectors of the economy, close supervision of foreign investment, and local industrializa-
tion based on the protection of domestic industry from foreign competition." ARMY
STUDY, supra note 30, at 221.
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save the nation from political discord.196 Although the military
immediately suspended the Constitution 19 7 it left the judiciary
intact.1 98 As it did in the Acordada of 1930,99 the Supreme
Court once again recognized the validity of the defacto Govern-
ment.2"' The military Government did not take into account,
however, the internal discord among its officers.201 During the
ensuing internal struggle between the army's Liberal0 2 and Na-
tionalist factions, neither faction stemmed the growth of Colonel
Juan Per6n's 20 3 populist movement. 204 Unable to solve the inter-
nal friction, the military called for new elections in 1946.205 Juan
Per6n won decisively. 20 6
4. Per6n's First Era: 1946 - 1955
The Peronists recognized constitutional principles in lim-
ited areas207 while ignoring such ideas in others.208 Ignoring the
rule of law, President Juan Per6n purged the Supreme Court by
196. POTASH (1928-1945), supra note 27, at 202, 204.
197. ARMY STUDY, supra note 30, at 51.
198. Vera Villalobos, supra note 18, at 462.
199. 1930 Acordada, 158 Fallos at 290-91.
200. 1943 Acordada, 196 Fallos at 6-7.
201. DAVID ROCK, AUTHORITARIAN ARGENTINA 135-36 (1993) [hereinafter AUTHORI-
TARIAN]; see generally POTASH (1928-1945), supra note 27, at 201-37 (detailing internal
divisions in Argentine army from 1943 to 1945).
202. POTASH (1928-1945), supra note 27, at 286. The liberal faction of the armed
forces was the faction that wished to maintain the traditional constitutional framework.
Id.
203. WHITAKER, supra note 42, at 104. Juan Per6n belonged to the group of mili-
tary officers responsible for the 1943 coup. Id. at 114. For much of the defacto Govern-
ment between 1943 and 1946, Juan Per6n ran the Department of Labor and Social
Security as well as being the Ministry of War's secretariat. Id. From 1944 to 1945, Juan
Per6n was the defacto Government's Vice-President. Id. at 115-19.
204. POTASH (1928-1945), supra note 27, at 285-86. Juan Per6n used his position
as head of the Department of Labor and Social Security to mobilize the unions behind
his drive for industrialization and to obtain greater benefits for workers. WHITAKER,
supra note 42, at 115-17.
205. RocK, supra note 24, at 261.
206. Id. at 261. In the 1946 presidential election,Juan Per6n won 56% of the vote.
WHITAKER, supra, note 42, at 120. The Peronist party won two-thirds of the seats in both
Chambers of Congress. Id.
207. CALVERT, supra note 24, at 53. The Peronists reformed the Constitution in
1949, allowing for the consecutive re-election of the president. Id. Although the Per-
onists probably had enough popular and military support to force their constitutional
changes upon the opposition, they chose to initiate them through the procedure set
out in the Constitution of 1853. Id.
208. JOSEPH PACE, PERON: A BIOcRAPHY 164-67 (1983) (discussing Peronist inter-
ference with Supreme Court); id. at 207-18 (discussing Peronist repression of opposi-
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impeaching three of the four Justices on dubious charges.209
The Peronist Congress also called a Constituent Assembly that
passed a new constitution21 that permitted the president to run
for re-election. PresidentJuan Per6n hindered political oppo-
sition2 1 2 and the media2 13 as his Government became more au-
thoritarian.2 14 President Juan Per6n sought re-election in 1952
and won two-thirds of the vote in a marred election.2 1 1 President
Juan Per6n declared a state of siege that lasted from shortly
before his second re-election in 1952 until 1955, allowing for
greater executive power.2 6 Despite these acts, Per6n was unable
to contain the expansion of opposition resulting from the eco-
nomic troubles of the early 1950's217 and the political frustration
of his opponents.2 18 These factors led to Argentina's third coup
d'etat of the twentieth century. 9
5. Anti-Peronist Liberals: 1955 - 1958
United in their dislike of Juan Per6n, the Liberal military
regime that emerged after the coup 22 0 replaced the Constitution
tion); Kartheiser, supra note 31, at 245 (discussing Peronist interference with freedom
of press).
209. PAGE, supra note 208, at 164-67. In order to place all the branches of govern-
ment in Peronist hands, Congress impeached three of the fourJustices of the Supreme
Court on the contradictory charges of failing to condemn the military governments of
1930 and 1943 and of illegally hindering their work. Id. While the Peronists altered the
trial procedure to the detriment of the Justices, Congress impeached the Justices in a
constitutional manner. Id. Although Congress followed the constitutional procedure,
the charges did not amount to malfeasance. Id. One of the replacement Justices was
the brother-in-law of Eva Per6n, Juan Per6n's second wife. Id.
210. CONST. ARG. (1949).
211. PAGE, supra, note 208, at 200-06.
212. ROBERT A. POTASH, THE ARMY & POLITICS IN ARGENTINA, 1945-1962, at 104-05
(1980) [hereinafter POTASH (1945-1962)]; see generally PAGE, supra note 208, at 207-18
(discussing Peronist interference with political opposition).
213. Kartheiser, supra note 31, at 245.
214. WHITAXER, supra note 42, at 139-43 (describing emerging totalitarian ap-
pearence of Peronist Government).
215. Id. at 140-41. The Peronists denied the Radicals use of the radio or press. Id.
at 140. Peronist supporters harassed Radicals at Radical Party rallies. Id. at 141.
216. ARMY STUDY, supra note 30, at 56; ROCK, supra note 24, at 306.
217. WHITAKER, supra note 42, at 136-39. Between 1948 and 1952, as the national
population rose from 15.4 million to 18 million, gross national product dropped from
62.3 billion Argentine pesos to 49.3 billion pesos. Id. at 137.
218. POTASH (1945-1962), supra note 212, at 170. AmongJuan Per6n's opponents
were the Radicals, the Conservatives, and the Catholic Church. Id. at 173.
219. ROCK, supra note 24, at 306-18.
220. Id. at 334. The Liberals in the military sought the eradication of Peronism
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of 1949221 with that of 1853,2 disbanded the Peronist Supreme
Court Justices, 22 ' and replaced them with their own appoin-
tees.224 The Liberal regime's dismantling of Peronism was not
just directed at the Peronist structure of government,225 but at
the party itself.226 The military banned Peronist party members
who had held office from participating in any form of govern-
ment.22 '7 The military outlawed the existence of the Peronist
party and any use of its name or symbols. 228 Finally, the military
attempted to exterminate the Peronist party through the arrest,
murder, and torture of key Peronist leaders.2 29 The regimes's
cohesive element of anti-Peronism, however, evaporated with
their failure to define themselves in a positive political light or to
achieve economic stability.230 While this dwindling unity within
the Liberal regime resulted in the elections of 1958, the liberals
maintained a focused determination to bar the Peronist party
from Argentine government. Id. Economically, they advocated a plan of deregulation,
limited privatization of state industry, and a reduction in government spending. Id. at
335.
221. CONST. ARG. (1949).
222. CONST. ARG.; RocK, supra note 24, at 335. The military wanted to extract all
vestiges of Peronism from government, including the Constitution of 1949 that the Per-
onist dominated Constituent Assembly passed. Id.
223. Vera Villalobos, supra note 18, at 462.
224. Id.
225. RocK, supra note 24, at 334-37; POTASH (1945-1962), supra note 212, at 228-
30. The military replaced the Constitution enacted by the Peronists with the Constitu-
tion of 1853. RocK, supra note 24, at 335. The military Government also replaced the
Justices on the Supreme Court appointed by the Peronists with their own appointees.
Vera Villalobos, supra note 18, at 462.
226. RocK, supra note 24, at 334-37: POTASH (1945-1962), supra note 212, at 228-
30; ARMY STUDY, supra note 30, at 58. The military sought "to discredit all those who
had held leadership positions with the Peronist movement and to destroy any possibility
for the recreation of a mass movement with its characteristics." POTASH (1945-1962),
supra note 212, at 228. The military Government seized all the assets of the Peronist
party. Id. In addition to outlawing the Peronist party, the military intervened in the
organization of labor unions aligned with the Peronists. Id. at 228.
227. RoCK, supra note 24, at 334-37: POTASH (1945-1962), supra note 212, at 228-
30. The ban on Peronist Government officials from holding a government post only
applied to elected officials or those who had been in high appointive posts. Id.
228. RoCK, supra note 24, at 334-37; POTASH (1945-1962), supra note 212, at 228-
30. Because the military banned Juan Per6n's name, the Argentine populace now re-
ferred to him by a slew of euphemisms, of which the one most acceptable to the military
was the "fugitive tyrant." RoCK, supra note 24, at 334-37.
229. RocK, supra note 24, at 334-37; POTASH (1945-1962), supra note 212, at 228-
30; ARmry STUDY, supra note 30, at 58.
230. ROCK, supra note 24, at 306-07.
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from the elections.23
6. Semi-Democracy: 1958 - 1966
The first President of this period won an election in which
the military forbid Peronist candidates to participate. 32 When
the civilian Government once again allowed the Peronists to par-
ticipate in elections in 1961,233 the Peronists won ten of the four-
teen contested provinces.2 34  The military demanded that the
elections be annulled.2 3   When the President refused to com-
ply,236 the military overthrew him.23 7 Instead of assuming con-
trol of the Government, the military appointed a provisorial
president 238 and held new presidential and congressional elec-
tions. 2 9 The new elections involved even greater limitations of
political participation 24 ° and delivered a president with little
public or military support.2 4 1 The lack of widespread support
for the new President 24 2 and his failure to stimulate the economy
undermined his administration. 3
7. Military Rule: 1966 - 1973
In 1966, the military overthrew the constitutional Govern-
ment. 24  In the tradition of its military predecessors, the military
231. Id.
232. KENNETH L. KARST & KEITH S. ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN
AMERICA 199 (1975) [hereinafter LAw AND DEVELOPMENT]. Because the military barred
the Peronist party, the Peronists could not field a candidate in the 1958 elections. Id.
Arturo Frondizi, the winner of the 1958 presidential elections, received two-thirds of
the vote. WHITAKER, supra note 42, at 158. The Radicals, President Frondizi's party,
won two-thirds of the seats in both Chambers of Congress. Id.
233. PAGE, supra note 208, at 376.
234. ROCK, supra note 24, at 342.
235. LAW AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 232, at 199.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. PAGE, supra note 208, at 379. Because the Vice-President of deposed Presi-
dent Frondizi refused to assume the executive office, the President of the Senate be-
came the next president of Argentina. Id.
239. RocK, supra note 24, at 342.
240. Id. at 344. The military did not permit the Peronists, parties with substantial
ties to the Peronists, or the last elected President to participate in the new elections. Id.
241. Id. The winning candidate received only 25% of the vote. Id.
242. Id. The military appointed Dr. Jos6 Maria Guido, previously the President of
the Senate, as the provisional President of Argentina. LAw AND DEVELOPMENT, supra
note 232, at 200.
243. RocK, supra note 24, at 344.
244. ARMY STUDY, supra note 30, at 60. The constitutional Government that the
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regime oppressed opposition 245 and tinkered with the judici-
ary.246 The military once again viewed itself as the nation's sav-
or.47 The military's desire to save the nation, however, lacked
popular or political support.248 Denied political participation,
groups on the left249 turned to terrorism2 50 as a means of imple-
menting change. 251 As a counter to these groups, right-wing ter-
rorists252 took the law into their own hands. 53 The emerging
military overthrew in 1966 had little popular or political support. Id. Among the fac-
tors leading to the decision to stage a coup d'etat was a slew of Peronist labor action
"designed to force the government to allow for Per6n's return. Elements in the military
felt that stability could be achieved only through the repression of some of those
groups." Id.
245. ROCK, supra note 24, at 348.
246. Vera Villalobos, supra note 18, at 462. In 1966, the military replaced all of the
Justices of the Supreme Court. Id.
247. ROCK, supra note 24, at 347. Unlike the previous de facto governments, this
regime did not label its government as provisional. Id. The military saw no need to
prepare for the return of civilian government. Id.
248. Id. at 346-47. The military Government that emerged after the coup "sought
to create a modernizing autocracy that would change society from above, with or with-
out popular backing." Id. at 436-47. This defacto Government was a "hard-line regime
prepared to make immediate resort to force to quell all competing institutions and any
real or imaginary adversaries." Id. at 347.
249. AUTHORITARIAN, supra note 201, at 223. Among these groups on the left were
organizations associated with Peronist Youth organizations. HODGES, supra note 14, at
97-99. The Monteneros, an urban guerilla movement, had the strongest ties to the leftist
elements of the Peronist party. Id. They sought a return to Peronism, a stronger state,
and less foreign influence in Argentina. Id. A similar group was the Peronist Armed
Force ("FAP"). Id. The People's Revolutionary Army ("ERP") was independent from
the Peronist party and had connections with Trotskyist and Pan-American Revolution-
ary organizations. Id. at 99-100.
250. HODGES, supra note 14, at 96; ROCK, supra note 24, at 353; see generally Roberto
P. Guimaries, Understanding Support for Terrorism Through Survey Data: The Case of Argen-
tina, 1973, in JUAN PERON AND THE RESHAPING OF ARGENTINA 189, 189-202 (Frederick C.
Turner &Jos6 E. Miguens eds., 1983) (discussing acceptance among Argentines in 1973
of terrorism as means of implementing democratic reform). The most notable exam-
ple of left-wing terrorism during this period was the kidnapping and execution of the
former defacto President Pedro Aramburu. HODGES, supra note 14, at 96. After killing
Pedro Aramburu, the terrorists absconded with his body to accentuate their political
statement. Arthur M. Shapiro, Political Necrophilia: Holding (Per6n's) Hands in Argentina,
NEw LEADER, Aug. 10-24, 1987, at 5-8. The terrorists also involved themselves in "kid-
naps, bank robberies, occasional assassinations of senior Army or police personnel, and
Robin Hood escapades in which multinationals were forced to make charity handouts
in the shanty towns in return for abducted executives." ROCK, supra note 24, at 353.
251. AUTHORITARIAN, supra note 201, at 213-22; ROCK, supra note 24, at 352-55.
252. HODGES, supra note 14, at 172-75. These terrorists were mostly police and
military officers who were acting unofficially. Id.
253. RocK, supra note 24, at 355; AUTHORITARIAN, supra note 201, at 223; HODGES,
supra note 14, at 172-75. Terrorist acts included destruction of homes, bombings, assas-
sinations, and disappearances. HODGES, supra note 14, at 172-75.
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political radicalism and extremism of this period alerted the mil-
itary regime of a need for national reconciliation.254 The at-
tempted reconciliation included open elections in which the
Peronists could participate.255
8. The Return of Per6n: 1973 - 1976
The Peronists decisively won the open presidential and con-
gressional elections of 1973.256 While the Peronists were united
in their support for Juan Per6n and their opposition to the mili-
tary government, 257 they were sharply divided as to what to do
once in power.258 Whatever cohesion existed within the Peronist
party dissipated with the death of Juan Per6n.259 After Juan
Per6n's death, political violence on both the right and the left
increased dramatically260 and inflation was severe. 261 The new
Argentine President 262 was politically impotent.268  The military
254. Roc, supra note 24, at 356-57.
255. Id.; PAGE, supra note 208, at 420.
256. PAGE, supra note 208, at 449. The Peronist presidential candidate won nearly
50% of the vote, with the closest candidate receiving about 22%. Id. The Peronists won
over half of the seats in both chambers of Congress. Id. The Peronists won all but one
of the provincial governorships. Id. As a show of allegiance to Juan Per6n and in re-
sponse to the demands of the Peronists, the Peronist presidential candidate who won
the elections of 1973 resigned so that new elections could be held in which Juan Per6n
would participate. Id. at 470. Juan Per6n won the new election in 1973 with 60% of the
vote. Id. at 474. His third wife, Isabel Per6n, was his Vice-President. Id. at 472.
257. ROcy, supra note 24, at 362.
258. Id.
259. Id. The division within the Peronist party ranged from those on the extreme
left, including many who supported both the ERP and FAP, to those on the extreme
right, including those involved in right-wing death squads and terrorist organizations.
Id. at 360-62. The two extremes openly clashed at a public display of support of over
half a million people at Buenos Aires' international airport on the day of Juan Per6n'
return to Argentina for the first time since the military coup that overthrew him in
1955. Id. at 360. Over 200 people, the vast majority of whom was on the left, died in
this armed clash between the two extremes. HODGES, supra note 14, at 172.
260. PAGE, supra note 208, at 496-97; ROCK, supra note 24, at 363-64; AUTHORITA-
RIAN, supra note 201, at 223-24. The most notorious right-wing terrorist organization
was Lopez Rega's Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance ("Triple A"). HODGES, supra
note 14, at 173-76. In the first seven months of 1975, the Triple A assassinated 450
people and caused the disappearance of another 2000. Id. at 175. The left-wing ERP
terrorists attacked army barracks, kidnapped people for ransom money, and occupied a
"liberated territory" in the Province of Tucumdn. Id. at 101-02. Leftist terrorists caused
over 600 deaths between 1973 and 1976. Id. at 107.
261. ARMY STUDY, supra note 30, at 66.
262. PAGE, supra note 208, at 495. Isabel Per6n succeeded Juan Per6n as President
of Argentina. Id.
263. See id. at 495-99 (accounting President Isabel Per6n's ineptitude, lack of polit-
1604 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19:1578
waited until these factors eliminated any remaining popular sup-
port for the civilian government before overthrowing it in
1976.264
9. El Proceso: 1976 - 1983
The military began its new rule, known as el proceso,265 after
it deposed the constitutional Government.266 Once again, the
military suspended operation of the Constitution2 6 7 and tam-
pered with the judiciary and the Supreme Court.268 The junta
silenced opposition in the media, judiciary, and political
arena.269 This time, however, the military's repression involved
indiscriminate violations of human rights against anyone per-
ceived as a mild threat.270 The Junta supervised this repression,
ical experience and leadership, and dependence on bizarre advisor and founder of
Triple A).
264. Id. at 499; Roc, supra note 24, at 366.
265. Kartheiser, supra note 31, at 248. The name elproceso derives from the defacto
statute that replaced the legislature, executive, and judiciary with a military junta. Id.
The statute is the Acta para el Proceso de Reorganizacidn Nacional [Act for the Process of
National Reorganization], 36-B A.D.L.A. 1019 (1976). During el proceso, there was more
than one military junta that controlled the Government. Stotzky & Nino, supra note 16,
at 3.
266. PAGE, supra note 208, at 499; RocK, supra note 24, at 366.
267. Actapara el Proceso de Reorganizacidn Nacional, 36-B A.D.L.A. 1019 (1976). The
military Junta granted itself a variety of powers, including the power to stop all federal
and provincial orders, politically intervene in all of the provinces, dissolve Congress and
all provincial legislatures, suspend all political parties and activities, and remove
Supreme Court Justices and lower court judges. Id.
268. Id. art. 5, 36-B A.D.L.A. at 1019. Article 5 of the Acta para el Proceso de Reor-
ganizacitn Nacional states that the military Junta has the power to dissolve the Supreme
CourtJustices and all judges in lower courts. Id. Not only did the military junta replace
the Justices of the constitutionally appointed Supreme Court with ones who would ap-
prove of the junta's actions, but they replaced nearly a third of all the judges in Buenos
Aires and over 40% of those elsewhere in the country. VERBITSKY, supra note 119, at 19.
269. NUNCA MAs, supra note 177, 391-92. A committee of the constitutional gov-
ernment of 1984 reported that during el proceso "the right to life, security of person and
individual liberty had little to do with the decisions of the judges; the sole arbiters of
these decisions were the members of the State's repressive apparatus." Id. at 392. The
military had removed all of the sitting Supreme Court Justices and 24 federal judges
within a couple of weeks of the coup. Argentine Judiciary, supra note 141, at 315. By
1978, "a total of twenty-three members of the [Argentine] bar had been murdered, one
hundred nine detained, and forty-one disappeared." Id. at 316. Judges who were leni-
ent to those detainee who actually received a trial received death threats. Id. The only
judge during elproceso to declare the military government as illegal fled the country days
after issuing his opinion. Frederick E. Snyder, State of Siege and Rule of Law in Argentina:
The Politics and Rhetoric of Vindication, 15 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. Ray. 503, 517 (1984).
270. NUNCGA MAs, supra note 177, at 10. The official estimate of those who are still
disappeared, kidnapped by the military and never seen again, is around 9000 although
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believing that it was necessary and proper to achieve its objec-
tives.2 7 1
A faltering economy,272 military rivalries, 273 and the political
aftermath of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands war 274 led the mili-
tary to call for a return to a constitutional democracy in 1983.275
While the Junta tried to establish a more institutional role for
itself within the new constitutional Government, 276 the military
many more were detained and tortured. Id.; see generally id. at 9-282 (documenting and
reporting on methods and extent of human rights violations).
271. AUTHORITARIAN, supra note 201, at 225. The military junta held that "[i]n the
war on subversion, it would be no longer possible to apply 'judicial norms and stan-
dards.'" Id. at 225. In an attempt to validate their actions, the junta described the
human rights violations as inevitable occurrences in putting an end to terrorist vio-
lence. NUNCA MAS, supra note 177, at 8. The junta tried to justify their refusal to re-
lease information about those detained or disappeared by declaring, "[iun this type of
struggle the secrecy with which our special operations must be conducted means that
we cannot divulge whom we have captured and whom we want to capture; everything
must be enveloped in a cloud of secrecy." Id.
272. MARTIN E. ANDERSEN, DOSSIER SECRETO: THE MYTH OF ARGENTINA'S "DIRTY
WAR" 298-99 (1993); see generally Waisman, supra note 161, at 97 (listing worsening eco-
nomic indicators during el proceso). During el proceso, Argentina's foreign debt rose
from eight billion in 1976 to 40 billion in 1983. HODGES, supra note 14, at 7. Increasing
unemployment, decreasing consumer purchasing power. corruption, and capital flight
ailed the Argentine economy in the early 1980's. ANDERSEN, supra, at 298-99. By the
end of el proceso, inflation was at an annual rate of 600%. William C. Smith, Hyperinfla-
tion, Macroeconomic Instability, and Neoliberal Restructuring in Democratic Argentina, in NEW
DEMOCRACY, supra note 175, at 20, 26. The military Government's deficit in the public
sector was more than 20% of gross national product. Peralta-Ramos, supra note 176, at
46-47.
273. ANDERSEN, supra note 272, at 223-24. Each of Argentina's three armed forces,
the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, wanted to play a larger role in the junta. Id. In
addition to division by armed forces, ideological gulfs also separated those in the mili-
tary, ranging from one faction that advocated greater opposition participation to an-
other that sought renewed political repression. ARMY STUDY, supra note 30, at 69.
274. ANDERSEN, supra note 272, at 299-301. The Falkland/Malvinas Islands are a
chain of islands in the South Atlantic. Id. While Argentina and the United Kingdom
have disputed ownership of the islands for over a century and a half, the United King-
dom possessed them during this entire dispute, except for a few weeks during the
armed conflict. Id. at 299. In April 1982, Argentina invaded the islands and took con-
trol of them. Id. The United Kingdom fought to get them back, and the ensuing war
lasted a little over two months, resulting in the loss of 1000 Argentine and 250 British
lives and ending with the the British forces' victory over the Argentine forces. Id. The
Argentine military's false reports of early victories and lack of preparation for an armed
conflict that they initiated created deeper public resentment for the militaryjunta. Id.
275. Epstein, supra note 175, at 13; David Pion-Berlin & Ernest6 Lopez, A House
Divided: Crisis, Cleavage, and Conflict in the Argentine Army, in NEW DEMOCRACY, supra note
175, at 63, 69-73; Nino, supra note 176, at 130.
276. ROCK, supra note 24, at 384-85. The military sought to establish itself as an
independent power within the Constitution. Id. Furthermore, it sought constitutional
guarantees not to be prosecuted for human rights violations. Id.
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did not have sufficient bargaining power to obtain it.2 7 7 The mil-
itary allowed for democratic elections in 1983.278 Although the
Peronists won the Senate in the 1983 elections, the public essen-
tially rejected both the military and the Peronists 279 by electing
Radical party candidate Radl Alfonsin2 8 1 to the presidency and a
Radical party majority to the Chamber of Deputies.
10. Restoration of Democracy: 1983 - Present
President Alfonsin's administration set about to create
strong democratic institutions and government by consensus.282
Alfonsin viewed the new Government not as the continuation of
a democracy that authoritarian rule had temporarily suspended,
but rather as the creation of a new democracy whose institu-
tional and historical ancestors had ceased to exist.2 83 The Gov-
ernment sought and obtained convictions against members of
the military on the grounds of human rights violations. 284 The
Government argued against the constitutionality of the military's
277. Id.
278. Id. at 389.
279. Corporatism, supra note 176, at 130-131. The Peronist presidential candidate
declared that the military junta's law providing a self-amnesty for all human rights
abuses committed during their reign, was a valid law. Id. The Radicals claimed that
there was a secret pact between the military and the Peronists in which the military
would back the Peronists in return for leniency toward the military's human rights
abuses. ROCK, supra, note 24, at 388-89.
280. ANDERSEN, supra note 272, at 305-06. Ratil Alfonsin was the first non-Peronist
elected President in open elections in over fifty years. Id. He received 52% of the vote
as opposed to the nearly 40% by the Peronist candidate. Id.
281. ARMY STUDY, supra note 30, at 251; ROCK, supra note 24, at 388-89.
282. Alfonsin, supra note 2, at 41-43.
283. Id. at 43; Marcelo Cavarozzi & Maria Grossi, Argentine Parties under Alfonsin:
From Democratic Reinvention to Political Decline and Hyperinflation, in NEw DEMOCRACY,
supra note 175, at 173, 174. Referring to his government, Alfonsin wrote:
We begin with the conviction that only through institutionalization of
democratic procedures, dialogue, and participation would it be possible to lay
the groundwork to establish the sovereignty of law. The task of reinstating the
rule of law in Argentina demanded a profound transformation. We repeat-
edly emphasized that Argentina's transition to democracy should not be re-
garded as a restorative process, but rather as a process of creation-of new
institutions, new procedures, new habits, and new ways to cohabit peacefully.
We were faced not with reconstructing an already functioning system, tempo-
rarily disbanded by authoritarianism, but with the need to establish new foun-
dations so that an authentic democratic institution could emerge.
Alfonsin, supra note 2, at 43.
284. Henry Dahl & Alejandro M. Garro, Introductory Note to Argentina: National Ap-
peals Court (Criminal Division)Judgment on Human Rights Violations by Former Military Lead-
ers, 26 I.L.M. 317, 319, 327 (1987).
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self amnesty for human rights violations during el proceso.285 The
judiciary gained independence from any one party because ap-
pointments of federal judges and Supreme Court Justices only
occurred after President Alfonsin's compromises over candi-
dates with the Peronist dominated Senate.286
Increasing concern for economic stability rather than the
creation of a stable democracy brought about Peronist victory, at
the expense the Radicals, in the May 1989 elections.287 During
the Alfonsin administration, Argentina experienced hyper-infla-
tion.288 The hyper-inflation that occurred during the Alfonsin
administration led to the victory of the Peronist candidate, Car-
los Menem, 289 in the 1989 presidential elections.290  To appease
a growing public restlessness, Alfonsin transferred the presi.-
dency to Menem five months before the constitutionally regis-
tered date.291
While President Menem has revitalized the economy,
2 92
there is concern that this has come at the health of democratic
institutions.293 President Menem and the Peronist Congress that
285. Id.
286. Stotzky & Nino, supra note 16, at 12; Alfonsin, supra note 2, at 46.
287. Smith, supra note 272, at 39-41. The Peronist presidential candidate beat the
Radical candidate by a margin of 51.7% to 39.2%. Id. The February before the May
election, the Argentine Central Bank's reserves were so low that it could no longer
afford to support the Argentine currency. Id. The economy collapsed as the Argentine
currency became devalued. Id. Monthly inflation increased from 12.3% in February, to
24.9% in March, to 54.3% in April, and to 98.2% in May. Id. at 38.
288. Id. at 41. Inflation rose from a monthly rate of 13.2% in February of 1989 to a
monthly rate of 98.2% in May of the same year. Id. Inflation in the months ofJune and
July in 1989 was respectively 114% and 196%. George de Lama, Hyperinflation Costing
Argentines Their Dreams, Their Futures, CHI. TRIB., Sep. 3, 1989, at Cl. Inflation for the
year neared one million percent. Id. See Smith, supra note 272, at 39-41 (describing
hyperinflation during Alfonsin administration).
289. Eugene Robinson, Argentina's Menem Sees Hard Times: Peronist Takes Office with
Call for Work, WASH. PosT,July 9, 1989, at A19. Carlos Saul Menem, a Peronist, became
President of Argentina in 1989. Id. He was the first elected president in 61 years to
succeeded another elected president. Id.
290. Smith, supra note 272, at 39-41.
291. Id. at 41.
292. William D. Rogers & Paolo Wright-Carozza, LA CORTE SUPREMA DEJuSTICIA Y
LA SEGURIDAD JURIDICA 141 (1995) (calling Menem Administration's achievements
"nothing short of an economic miracle"). In 1995, inflation in Argentina was 2% for
the year. Latin Realities, ECONOMIST, Mar. 30, 1996, at 19. Per anum growth of gross
national product reached as high as 7% under President Menem. Id. Between 1991
and 1993, Argentina's economy grew by 25.5%. Stephen Fidler &John Barham, Argen-
tine Miracle Needs More Foreign Capital, FIN. TIMES, June 22, 1994, at 8.
293. John Barham, Menem Gets His Way on Route to a Second Term: John Barham on a
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simultaneously won election in 1989 increased the number of
Supreme Court Justices from five to nine.2 94 The new Justices
were all politically allied with the President, raising about the
Supreme Court's independence. 95 Menem's government also
removed the Public Minister and other criminal and economic
investigators, despite their traditional status as occupying ten-
ured posts, subject only to congressional dismissal. 296 The presi-
dent's use of legislative decrees increased dramatically without
establishing boundaries as to when the executive can issue such
decrees. 297 President Menem politically intervened in four prov-
inces, giving him the power to remove the elected governors of
those provinces and replace them with new ones.2 9 8 The Per-
onists pushed for the passage of laws aimed at having a chilling
effect on the media.299 Additionally, widespread reports of cor-
Step Forward for Argentina's President and Misgivings About its Democracy, FIN. TIMES, Dec.
14, 1993, at 7 (stating "although Mr. Alfonsin restored democracy and Mr. Menem
brought economic stability, the latter is not the man to rebuild Argentina's institu-
tions"); Stotzky & Nino, supra note 16, at 8-9; Garro, supra note 15, at 8 (commenting,
"the promising economic take-off led by [President Menem] has been clouded by in-
creasing... mistrust of the administration's genuine commitment to the rule of law").
294. Stotzky & Nino, supra note 16, at 8; see generally VERBITSKY, supra note 119, at
47-52 (detailing expansion of Supreme Court).
295. Constitutional Reform, supra note 83, at 639 (1993) (mentioning "doubts over
the impartiality of the Supreme Court" resulting from "Menem government's court-
packing"); Alfonsin, supra note 2, at 49; John Barham, Carlos Menem Wins Second Shot:
But New Constitution Could Backfire Against the President, FIN. TIMES, Sep. 8, 1994, at 5;
Peter Ford, Menem Uses Court to Sell State Airline, INDEPENDENT, July 18, 1990, at 13; see
generally VERBITSKv, supra note 119, at 52-69 (outlining relationship between President
Menem and newJustices).
296. Stotzky & Nino, supra note 16, at 9; Alfonsin, supra note 2, at 51-52; Constitu-
tional Reform, supra note 83, at 641; VERBITSKV, supra note 119, at 79. See generally VERBrr-
SKY, supra note 119, at 79-135 (detailing President Menem's tightening of control over
state's investigative powers).
297. VERBITSKY, supra note 119, at 164-71; see supra notes 119-20 and accompanying
text (describing use of executive decree to legislate in exceptional circumstances).
Prior to President Menem, constitutional Argentina presidents had only used executive
decrees 30 times to legislate. VERBITSKY, supra note 119, at 164. President Menem is-
sued 244 legislative decrees in less than two and a half years from his date of inaugura-
tion. NEGRETrO, supra note 100, at 107. President Menem has issued decrees of ur-
gency and necessity to provide Bolivia with cement, to secure a contract with a foreign
company to produce new identification documents, and, later, to void that same con-
tract. VERBITSKY, supra note 119, at 165.
298. Garro, supra note 15, at 88; see supra note 121 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing presidential power to intervene in provinces). One of these provinces, Corrien-
tes, was the only province never to have had a Peronist government. Id. The previous
administration never intervened in a province. Id.
299. Editorial, Argentina's Pressured Press, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1995, at § 1, at 18.
Among the proposed laws were ones that would require all newspapers to carry
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ruption at all levels of government circulated. 0°
C. Modern Judicial Treatment of De Facto Laws
A defacto government rules by force, rather than in accord-
ance with a constitutional system.301 De facto governments use
force to usurp governmental functions from dejure governments,
the constitutionally appointed authorities.0 2 A de facto govern-
ment's rules, decrees, and regulations are defacto laws.303 Argen-
tina's treatment of defacto laws this century has included treating
all defacto laws as valid, recognizing defacto laws only in particu-
lar situations, and requiring express or tacit congressional treat-
ment of defacto laws before treating them as valid. 0 4
1. Limited Power of De Facto Governments: 1930 - 1947
The question of the legitimacy of de facto governments was
dormant from Martinez y Otero305 in the 1860's until the 1930's,
when the Court reaffirmed that de facto governments could be
legitimate30 6 and that their laws were valid until the return of
constitutional government.30 7 Shortly after General Uriburu's
coup in 1930,08 the Supreme Court issued an acordada,s°9 a res-
US$500,000 of libel insurance and that could impose a six-year prison term and
US$200,000 fine for libel. Calvin Sims, Press Protests 'Gag' Bills In Argentina. N.Y TIMES,
Feb. 19, 1995, § 1, at 15. See VERBIrrsKy, supra note 119, at 439-44 (describing Menem
Administration's strained relationship with press).
300. Garro, supra note 15, at 8; Katherine Ellison, Argentine President Battles Family
Scandals: Analysts Say Menem Weakened ty Disclosures, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 24,
1995, at A15; Matthew Doman, Cavallo Lashes 'Corrupt'Allies, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1995,
at 4; Calvin Sims, Menem Complains, But Press Has Turned President to 'Star, N.Y. TIMES,
May 24, 1995, § 1, at 5; see generally VERBITSKY, supra note 119, at 325-91 (documenting
recent scandals concerning Menem Administration).
301. Irizarry y Puente, supra note 4, at 25.
302. Id.
303. Alfonsin, supra note 2, at 50.
304. Nino, supra note 17, at 317-20 (discussing Court's treatment of defacto laws
from mid-nineteenth century to present); Vera Villalobos, supra note 18, at 462-67 (de-
tailing Court's standards for treating defacto laws from 1930 to present).
305. Martinez y Otero, 2 Fallos at 142-43.
306. 1930 Acordada, 158 Fallos at 291.
307. Administraci6n de Impuestos Internos c. Malmonge Nebreda, 169 Fallos 309,
319-20 (1933).
308. See supra notes 182-89 and accompanying text (describing General Uriburu's
coup).
309. 1930 Acordada, 158 Fallos at 291. While the Argentine Supreme Court is free
to issue acordadas, resolutions and statements on points of the law not under litigation
before the Court, the acordadas have no binding legal effect. Irizarry y Puente, supra
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olution, stating that the military regime legitimately ran the
country because it had the power and will to secure national
peace and order,31 ° vowed to maintain the supremacy of the
Constitution and national law,311 and was able to protect life, lib-
erty, and property.3 1I The resolution, however, recognized the
legitimacy of the military Government and not the long term va-
lidity of its legislation. 3
From 1933 " 4 to 1947,315 the Court adopted the theory of
caducidad.3 1 6 This theory posits that while a defacto law may have
some legitimacy arising from urgency and necessity, the return
of democratic institutions strips it of that legitimacy.3 17 In
Malmonge Nebrada,318 the Court found that Uriburu's defacto gov-
ernment temporarily replaced only the executive and, therefore,
had neither judicial nor legislative power.31 9 Only under situa-
note 4, at 33-34. Article 100 of the Argentine Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to judicial cases, controversies and suits between parties. CONST. ARc.
art. 100. Because an acordada is a statement on a topic without adversarial parties, the
only effect is to put a non-binding, albeit respected, " 'constitutional seal' of approval
upon (the defacto government] through a declaration outside of the scope of ajudicial
proceeding." Irizarry y Puente, supra note 4, at 33-34.
310. 1930 Acordada, 158 Fallos at 290. The Court affirmed the legitimacy of the de
facto Government because it had the necessary force to "as~gurar la paz y el orden de la
Naci6n, y por consiguiente para proteger la libertad, la vida y la propiedad de las per-
sonas, y ha declarado, ademis, en actos pfiblicos, que mantendri la supremacia de la
Constituci6n y de las leyes del pais, en el ejercicio del poder." Id. ["assure the peace
and order of the Nation, and, consequently, to protect the life, liberty, and property of
the people, and, furthermore, the defacto government has declared in public acts that
they will maintain the supremacy of the Constitution and of the laws of the country in
the exercise of power."] (translation by Note author).
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Nebreda, 169 Fallos at 320 (establishing theory of caducidad).
315. Arlandini, 208 Fallos at 186 (overruling theory of caducidad).
316. Corti, supra note 18, at 971. The theory of caducidad posits that defacto legis-
lation is legitimate during the exceptional circumstances of a defacto government, but,
with the return of constitutional rule, this legitimacy ceases. Id.
317. Nebreda, 169 Fallos at 320.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 319-20. The Court stated:
[H]ay que convenir en que el Presidente de la Naci6n que asumi6 la direcci6n
del pais por la fuerza de las armas y que se llam6 provisional, tuvo los mismos
poderes que el Presidente legal, consigados y enumerados en ... la Constitu-
ci6n Nacional.
Su misi6n fue gobernar el pats, poniendo en acci6n sus instituciones de
acuerdo con las leyes existentes, durante el tiempo necesario para volver a la
normalidad.
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tions of vital urgency could the regime enact laws °32 0 and, even
then, these laws ceased to have effect immediately upon the re-
turn of democracy, unless Congress ratified them.32
From 1945 to 1947, the Court modified its approach to the
legislative powers of defacto regimes without overruling the the-
ory of caducidad.3 22 It recognized that a de facto government
needs certain powers to fulfill properly its responsibilities3 23 and
it can exercise legitimately these powers so long as it does so with
respect for constitutional rights and guarantees.3 24 These legis-
lative powers, however, were not without limitations. 325 Under
the theory of caducidad, the Court held that a de facto govern-
ment could not pass laws on criminal matters,32 6 interfere with
the judiciary,3 27 or amend, suspend, or repeal laws enacted
within a constitutional framework.32 8
2. Full Plenary Powers: 1947 - 1973
In 1947, the Argentine Supreme Court gave full plenary
De ahi se desprende que ese gobierno tuvo las facultades ejecutivas, mas
no las legislativas yjudiciales.
Id.
[[I]t must be granted that the President of the Nation who assumed control of
the country by force of arms and labeled himself provisional, had all of the
same powers as the legal President, consigned and enumerated in . . . the
National Constitution.
His mission was to govern the country, putting into action its institutions
in agreement with existing laws, during the time necessary to return to nor-
mality.
It follows from this that this Government had executive abilities, but not
legislative or judicial.] (translation by Note author).
320. Id.
321. Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires v. Mayer, 201 Fallos 249, 270
(1945).
322. Irizarry y Puente, supra note 4, at 41-43.
323. Mayer, 201 Fallos at 272.
324. Ciarrapico v. Marino, [1946-1] J.A. 615, 617 (1946).
325. Anders, [1946-I] J.A. 740, 741-42 (1945) (holding defacto Government could
not legislate in criminal and penal matters); Acordada, [1945-111] J.A. 806, 807 (1945)
(stating that de facto Government could not interfere with judiciary); Parada Lopez,
[1945-111] J.A. 44, 45 (1945) (holding defacto laws could not repeal existing laws).
326. Anders, [1946-1] JA. at 741.
327. Acordada, [1945] J.A. at 807.
328. Parada Lopez, [1945-111] J.A. at 44 (1945); Compania de Dock Sud de Buenos
Aires, [1946-1] J.A. 89, 90 (1946) (holding de facto Government could not repeal ex-
isting law).
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power3 29 to defacto governments. 330 The Court lifted all of the
earlier limitations on a defacto government's legislative powers,
save that de facto governments could not pass unconstitutional
laws.3 3 ' De facto laws became equal to those enacted by Con-
gress. 32  De facto laws had the same legislative scope as Con-
gress' laws, they could only be repealed by future legislation, and
rights granted under them vested in the grantees.333 Both the
constitutionally appointed 1958 Supreme Court and the
Supreme Court appointed by the military junta of 1966 reaf-
firmed this doctrine. 33 4
3. 'In Extremis' and 'Real Effect': 1973 - 1976
With the return of democracy in 1973, the Court aban-
doned the de facto doctrine.33 1 While in Banco Centra33 6 the
Court denied that defacto legislation had a legitimate origin, the
Court conceded that it would treat de facto laws that had had a
real effect 337 as if they were legitimate.3 38 The Court added that
329. Irizarry y Puente, supra note 4, at 44-45. Full plenary powers entail all the
powers that the Constitution vests in the legislature. Id.
330. Arlandini, 208 Fallos at 184. The Peronist majority in Congress purged the
Court prior to this decision. Vera Villalobos, supra note 18, at 463. The Peronist
replacements significantly altered the ideology of the Court. PACE, supra note 208, at
164-67.
331. Vera Villalobos, supra note 18, at 463.
332. Corti, supra note 18, at 971-72. In a one page opinion in Ziella, the Court
held that defacto laws "son vdlidos por raz6n de su origen y, puesto que tienen el valor
de leyes, subsisten aunque no hayan sido ratificados por el Congreso mientras no sean
derogados de la finica manera que 6stas pueden serlo, es decir, por otras leyes." Ziella
v. Smiriglio Hnos., 209 Fallos 25, 27 (1947) ["are valid by reason of their origin and,
given that they have the status of laws, exist, although they have not been ratified by
Congress, as long as they are not repealed by the only method that they can be, that is,
by other laws."] (translation by Note author).
333. Id.
334. Amoroso Copello v. Amoroso Copello, 243 Fallos 265, 270-71 (1959); Cas-
sino, 270 Fallos 484, 485 (1968).
335. Vera Villalobos, supra note 18, at 463.
336. Banco Central de la Rep6blica Argentina v. S.C.A. International Electric, 291
Fallos 55, 61-62 (1975).
337. Corti, supra note 18, at 971-72. A law that had a "real effect" is a law that was
in practice during a defacto government and, consequently, had the effect of a dejure
law for a period of time. Id. In Banco Central, the Court assumed that the public de-
pended upon any law that was already in practice. Banco Central, 291 Fallos at 62.
338. Banco Central, 291 Fallos at 62. In Banco Central, the Court stated:
[L]as normas de substancia legislativa que un gobierno de facto dicta a titulo
de leyes carecen en su origen de legalidad, pero pueden legitimarse en tanto
que, dictadas en ejercicio del poder legislativo, hayan tenido real efectividad,
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Congress could repeal such laws, but it could not nullify them.33 9
The Court treated laws that were in extremis3 4° differently than
those that had a real effect.341 In Pedro Lopez,34 the Court held
that in extremis laws were based in illegitimacy and did not have
the benefit of public dependence to validate their treatment as
de jure laws. 43
4. Express or Implicit Ratification: 1984 - 1990
In Aramayo, 44 the Court reversed its treatment of de facto
laws by making their validity dependent upon Congress.3 4 The
Court held that only a constitutional legislature's ratification
could legitimize de facto laws. 346 Likewise, Congress could ex-
pressly nullify any such law ab initio3 47 if they had not previously
ratified it. 348 To find a balance between democratic principles
and the security of public expectations,349 the Court allowed rati-
en cuyo caso continfian en vigor mientras no sean derogadas por el Congreso
en funciones constitucionales.
Id. [[T] he rules of a legislative nature that a defacto government gives the title of laws,
are lacking in their legal origin, but they can become legitimate as long as, decreed in
the exercise of legislative power, they have obtained a real effect, in which case they
continue to be enforced as long as they are not constitutionally repealed by Con-
gress.] (translation by Note author).
339. S.R.L. Editora Popular Americana v. Gobierno Nacional, 289 Fallos 177, 179-
80 (1974).
340. Vera Villalobos, supra note 18, at 463. Laws that are in extremis are laws that de
facto governments enacted, but were to come into effect during the constitutional gov-
ernment. Id.
341. Id.
342. Pedro Lopez, 293 Fallos 417, 419 (1975).
343. Id. The Court states that to accept laws that are in extremis would be akin to
.aceptar que un gobierno de facto puede sustituir al Poder Legislativo que la Constitu-
ci6n Nacional establece .... lo que resulta desde todo punto de vista inadmisible." Id.
["accepting that a defacto government could take the place of the Legislative Branch
that the national Constitution establishes .... which is, from all points of view, illegiti-
mate."] (translation by Note author).
344. Aramayo, 306 Fallos at 73-74.
345. Aramayo, 306 Fallos at 74; see Soria contra Dir. Nac. de Vialidad, 307 Fallos
338, 343 (1985); Dufourq, 306 Fallos 175, 177 (1984).
346. Aramayo, 306 Fallos at 74; see Soria, 307 Fallos at 343; Dufourq, 306 Fallos at
177.
347. BLACK, supra note 7, at 6. Ab initio means "[f]rom the beginning; from the
first act; from the inception." Id. A law that is void ab initio is law that never had any
validity. Id.
348. Aramayo, 306 Fallos at 74; see Soria, 307 Fallos at 343; Dufourq, 306 Fallos at
177.
349. Vera Villalobos, supra note 18, at 463.
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fication to be either express or implicit."' 0
5. De Facto Doctrine Restored
After the expansion of the Argentine Supreme Court in
1990,351 the Court in Godoy3 5 2 advocated the restoration of the de
facto doctrine, the treatment of de facto laws as if they were legis-
lation that Congress itself had passed. 5 3 The Court restored the
de facto doctrine in Gaggiamo.3 5 4 Consequently, Congress could
only repeal these laws, regardless of their dubious origin, and
could not strip anyone of a right that had already vested under
it.35 5 A minority on the Court still espoused maintaining the pre-
vious standard, as expressed in Aramayo,3 56 of validity by congres-
sional ratification only.3 57
350. Soria, 307 Fallos at 343; Dufourq, 306 Fallos at 177; Aramayo, 306 Fallos at 74.
351. See supra notes 294-95 and accompanying text (explaining expansion of
Supreme Court).
352. Godoy, [1991-11] J.A. at 458.
353. Id.; Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 483.
354. Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 484. The Court held that:
[C]omo fue especialmente destacado en el caso "Godoy", los actos de los
gobernantes de facto son vdlidos desde su origen, o bien deben considerarse
legitimados por su efectividad, de forma que la ley dictada por un gobierno
"de facto", "respecto con su validez", debe ser juzgada como si hubiese
emanado del propio Congreso o de la respectiva Legislatura.
Id. [[A]s was especially outlined in the case of Godoy, the acts of defacto governors are
valid from their origen, or, better yet, should be considered legitimate for their effect,
in such a form that a law dictated by a defacto government, "with respect to its validity,"
should judged as if it had come from Congress itself or the respective legislature.]
(translation by Note author). In Pignatoro, the Court stated that, in Godoy, "la validez o
legitimidad de los actos de los gobernantes de facto ha sido expresamente reconocida
por esta Corte." ["the validity, or legitimacy, of the acts of defacto governments have
been expressly recognized by this Court."] (translation by Note author). Pignatoro,
[1992-D] L.L. 82, 88 (1991).
355. Id. at 485. The Court held that a provincial Attorney General, who the mili-
tary government granted a privileged pension twelve days before the restoration of de-
mocracy and whose pension the constitutional provincial legislature expressly rejected
within two months of returning to office, had a right to that pension because within
those two months his right to the pension had vested. Id.
356. Aramayo, 306 Fallos at 73-74; see supra notes 344-50 and accompanying text
(outlining Aramayo standard requiring express or tacit congressional ratification of de
facto laws).
357. Godoy, [1991-11] J.A. at 458 (Fayt, J., dissenting); Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at
485, (Belluscio, J., dissenting); Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 486 (Fayt, J., dissenting);
Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 488 (Petracchi, J. dissenting); see supra notes 344-50 and
accompanying text (describing Court's adoption of Aramayo standard).
DE FACTO LAWS IN ARGENTINA
D. Constitutional Reform of 1994
The divergent interests of the Peronists and the Radical
party combined to generate constitutional reform in 1994.358
One of the reforms expressly prohibits the use of force to sus-
pend the Constitution and instantly nullifies the validity of all
acts towards that end."5 9 The Radical party wanted the reforms
to provide a larger voice for opposition parties so that the major-
ity party would have difficulty in controlling all branches of gov-
ernment. 6 ° The Constitution now ensures that the party receiv-
ing the second largest amount of votes in a province will send a
Senator to Congress. 361  The constitutional reform made the
Public Ministry a fourth independent branch of government.
362
The Peronists were concerned with changing election laws and
allowing the President to serve two consecutive terms.36 3 As a
consequence of this change,364 Carlos Menem, a Peronist, won
re-election to a second presidency.363
II DE FACTO LAWS: ARE THEY LEGITIMATE?
In 1991, the Argentine Supreme Court reversed its position
on defacto laws and returned to the standard that treats defacto
laws as legitimate equals of de jure laws.3 66 Throughout Argen-
358. Gisbert H. Flanz, Introductory Notes to CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 8, at iii, v. In
April 1994, the Constitutional Constituent Assembly met to draft constitutional changes
and ultimately enacted those changes in August 1994. Id.
359. CONST. ARG. art. 36. Article 36 states that the Constitution "remains in power
even when its observance is interrupted by acts of force against the institutional order
and the democratic system. These acts are irredeemably null." Id.
360. Barham, supra note 294, at 5. Among those measures added to give more
power to opposition parties are the establishment of the Attorney General as an in-
dependent branch of government, the addition of one senator from each province who
must be from an opposition party, and the assignment of more control to the legisla-
ture on matters of judiciary and investigative matters. Id.
361. CONST. ARG. art. 54. Each province sends three senators to Cotgress, two of
whom belong to "the political party obtaining the greatest number of votes and the rest,
to the political party receiving the next largest number of votes." Id.
362. Id. art. 120.
363. Barham, supra note 295, at 5; Stephen Fidler, Survey of Argentina, FIN. TIMEs,
July 13, 1994, at 11; Paula L. Green, Argentine Politicians Bens to Popular Will, CHRISTIAN
SCL MoNrroR, June 1, 1994, at 4. Until 1994, the president could not seek consecutive
re-election. CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 8, at xii.
364. CONST. ARG. art. 90.
365. Ellison, supra note 300, at A15. President Menem started his second term in
1995. Id. President Menem's term is set to expire in December 1999. CONST. ARG.
Transitional Provision 10.
366. Gaggiamo, [1992-)] L.L. at 484 (stating that de facto laws "debe ser juzgada
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tine history, the Supreme Court Justices and scholars who advo-
cated the validity of defacto laws have argued for the acceptance
of defacto laws on the grounds that defacto governments are legit-
imate, 367 other nations and international practice recognize the
legitimacy of defacto laws,368 and public expectations based on de
facto laws warrant fulfillment. 69 The Supreme Court Justices37 °
and scholars 7 ' who support requiring congressional ratification
of defacto laws argue that treating defacto laws as equal to dejure
laws ignores the illegitimacy of defacto governments. 72
A. Arguments Supporting Validity of De Facto Laws
Several scholars and Supreme Court Justices have defended
defacto laws on the grounds that defacto governments are legiti-
mate and that this legitimacy extends to their laws. 7 3 Others
find de facto laws valid because of foreign and international doc-
trines.3 74 A different approach legitimizes de facto laws because
of the public's expectations that these laws are valid and because
of the potential consequences of what would happen if these ex-
pectations were not met.
3 75
como si hubiese emanado del propio Congreso." ["ought to be judged as if they had
come from Congress itself."] (translation by Note author)); see supra notes 351-55 and
accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's restoration of de facto doctrine); see
supra notes 344-50 and accompanying text (describing previous standard for treatment
of defacto laws that required express or tacit congressional ratification).
367. Cassino, 270 Fallos at 485; Ferrocarril Oeste, 209 Fallos 274, 288-89 (1946);
Artandini, 208 Fallos at 186; Ziella, 209 Fallos at 27; 1930 Acordada 158 Fallos at 290;
Martinez y Otero, 2 Fallos at 142-43; Irizarry y Puente, supra note 4, at 71.
368. 1943 Acordada, 196 Fallos at 6; 1930 Acordada, 158 Fallos at 290 (citing un-
named international practices as authority for supporting use of defacto doctrine); AL.
BERT CONSTANTINEAU, A TREATISE ON THE DE FACTO DOCTRINE 3-6, 409 (1910).
369. Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 483-84; Godoy, [1991-I1] JA. at 458-59.
370. Aramayo, 306 Fallos at 73-74 (describing democracy as return to constitutional
order); Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 489 (PetracchiJ., dissenting)
371. Alfonsin, supra note 2, at 42-43; VERBnTSKY, supra note 119, at 154-58; Snyder,
supra note 268, at 512.
372. Aramayo, 306 Fallos at 73-74 (describing democracy as return to constitutional
order); Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 489 (Petracchi, J., dissenting); Alfonsin, supra note
2, at 42-43; VERBITSKY, supra note 119, at 154-58; Snyder, supra note 269, at 512.
373. Arlandini, 208 Fallos at 186; Ziella, 209 Fallos at 27; Ferrocarril Oeste, 209 Fallos
at 288-89; Cassino, 270 Fallos at 485; 1930 Acordada 158 Fallos at 290; Martinezy Otero, 2
Fallos at 142-43; Irizarry y Puente, supra note 4, at 71.
374. 1943 Acordada, 196 Fallos at 6; 1930 Acordada, 158 Fallos at 290; CONSTAN-
TINEAU, supra note 368, at 3-6, 409.
375. Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 483-84; Godoy, [1991-I] JA at 458-59.
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1. The Government That Made Them Was Legitimate
Supreme Court Justices and scholars have argued that if a de
facto government exercises power in a legitimate manner, then
its laws are on par with other legitimate governments. 3 76 Some
Justices have held that de facto governments are constitutionally
legitimate governments.37 7 Some scholars have argued that, re-
gardless of whether defacto governments are constitutional, they
are legitimate because they exercise control over the nation. 78
a. Constitutionally Legitimate
On several occasions, the Argentine Supreme Court found
that defacto governments that pledged to uphold constitutional
guarantees had constitutionally legitimate powers.3 7 9  In the
Acordada of 1930,380 the Court stated that the combination of
exercising national power and affirming protection of constitu-
tional rights is a sufficient criterion for the Court to grant defacto
governments constitutional legitimacy.3 1l  Further, in the
Acordada of 1930,32 the Court found for the first time that the
legitimacy of defacto governments was a nonjusticiable political
question.383 Between 1947 and 1973, the Court expanded its def-
inition of a de facto government's legitimate powers by finding
376. Cassino, 270 Fallos at 485; Ziella, 209 Fallos at 27; Ferrocarril Oeste, 209 Fallos at
288-89; Arlandini, 208 Fallos at 186; 1930 Acordada, 158 Fallos at 290; Martinez y Otero, 2
Fallos at 142-43; CONSTANTINEAU, supra note 368, at 3-6, 409; Irizarry y Puente, supra
note 4, at 71.
377. Cassino, 270 Fallos at 485; Ziella, 209 Fallos at 27; Ferrocarril Oeste, 209 Fallos at
288-89; Arlandini, 208 Fallos at 186; 1930 Acordada, 158 Fallos at 290; Martinezy Otero, 2
Fallos at 142-43.
378. CONSTANTINEAU, supra note 368, at 3-6, 409; Irizarry y Puente, supra note 4, at
71.
379. Cassino, 270 Fallos at 485; Ziella, 209 Fallos at 27; Ferrocarril Oeste, 209 Fallos at
288; Arlandini, 208 Fallos at 186; 1930 Acordada, 158 Fallos at 290; Martinez y Otero, 2
Fallos at 143.
380. Martinez y Otero, 2 Fallos at 142.
381. 1930 Acordada, 158 Fallos at 290; see supra note 310 (quoting Court's reason-
ing in 1930 Acordada).
382. 1930 Acordada, 158 Fallos at 290.
383. Id. The Court found that:
[E]li gobierno provisional que acaba de constituirse en el pais, es, pues, un
gobierno de facto cuyo titulo no puede ser judicialmente discutido con 6xito
por las personas en cuanto ejercita la funci6n administrativa y politica der-
ivada de su posesi6n de la fuerza como resorte de orden y de seguridad social.
Id. [the provisional government that has just finished establishing itself in the country
is, therefore, a defacto government that derived its possession of force as a means of
order and social security whose title cannot be judicially questioned by those for whom
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that the Constitution grants de facto governments legislative, as
well as executive, powers.3 84 Consequently, the Court held that
questioning the legitimacy of a constitutional legislature was also
a non-justiciable political question beyond its jurisdiction. s 5
To strengthen the argument favoring the legitimacy of de
facto laws, several scholars pointed to the maintenance of consti-
tutional guarantees during defacto governments as evidence that
defacto governments have protected such guarantees in deeds as
well as words.3 8 6 The Court appointed by the military in 1955
created the right to amparo.387 During the de facto Government
of the late 1960's, the Court issued opinions that offered greater
protection for freedom of the press.3 88 In Timerman389 in 1979,
the Court limited the defacto Government's use of arbitrary de-
tention. 390 Each of these decisions, made during defacto govern-
ments, limited the action of the defacto Government for the pro-
tection of an individual's rights.3 9 '
the government exercises policy and administrative functions.] (translation by Note au-
thor); 1943 Acordada, 196 Fallos at 6-7 (repeating verbatim previous holding).
At least one scholar argues that challenging the legitimacy of a defacto government
is not a non-justiciable political question. Puente, supra note 4, at 34-35. The argument
continues, however, that once the Court determines that the de facto government is
legitimate, any further questioning of the validity of its powers becomes a political ques-
tion. Id.
384. Cassino, 270 Fallos at 485; Ziella, 209 Fallos at 27; Ferrocarril Oeste, 209 Fallos at
288-89; Arlandini, 208 Fallos at 186.
385. Arlandini, 208 Fallos at 186. The Court in Arlandini stated, "en la medida en
que sea necesario legislar para gobernar un gobierno de hecho tiene facultades legisla-
tivas, sin que la determinaci6n de esa necesidad... pueda serjudicialmente revisada."
Id. [to the extent that it is necessary to govern, a de facto government has legislative
abilities, without the determination of the necessity being... subject to judicial review.]
(translation by Note author). The Court repeated this holding several times. Cassino,
270 Fallos at 485; Ziella, 209 Fallos at 27; Ferrocarril Oeste, 209 Fallos at 288-89.
386. BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 142, at 118; Kartheiser, supra note 31, at 251.
387. BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 142, at 118. Amaparo is the Argentine equivalent
of habeas corpus in the United States. See id. at 91-95 (describing amparo); see generally
LAW AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 232, at 160-83 (detailing expansion of amparo in
Argentina).
388. Primera Plana, 138 L.L. 464, 479-81 (1970) (finding state of siege did not
deny newspaper right to amparo); Prensa Confidencial, 130 L.L. 456, 460-61 (1968)
(recognizing criticism of public officials as pillar of republican government); Sinchez
Sorondo ("Azul y Blanco"), 130 L.L. 450, 453-56 (1968) (recognizing criticism of public
officials as pillar of republican government).
389. Timerman, 301 Fallos 771, 779-83 (1979).
390. Id.
391. BIDART CAMPOS, supra note 142, at 118.
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b. Legitimate Regardless of Constitution
At least one scholar argues that the goal of Argentina's gov-
ernment should not be the maintenance of an alien constitu-
tional system, but, rather, the betterment of the state and its in-
dividuals.392 The argument continues that this is particularly
true in Argentina, where Argentina's constitutional framework,
based upon foreign theories,393 does not take into account the
regional realities.3 94 The argument concludes that the best way
to achieve the betterment of the state in Latin America is
through the efficiency of defacto governments and that this abil-.
ity is the source of the legitimacy of defacto governments.395
2. Legitimacy of De Facto Laws in Other Countries
One line of argument posits that defacto laws are legitimate
because nations396 historically have recognized them as legiti-
mate. 97 In England, when the House of York 98 regained con-
392. Irizarry y Puente, supra note 4, at 72.
393. See supra notes 94-101 and accompanying text, (describing foreign influence
on Argentine Constitution).
394. Irizarry y Puente, supra note 4, at 71-72; see Rosenn, supra note 24, at 24-25
(describing foreign influence on Argentine Constitution as detrimental to its success).
395. Irizarry y Puente, supra note 4, at 72. One scholar warns that it "bodes ill for
the Judiciary in any country to interfere unduly with [de facto governments] and to
attempt to find in the letter of an outmoded Constitution an effectual barrier against
political, economic or social progress." Id. The same scholar declares that defacto gov-
ernments are the best "instruments of progress and social amelioration, of renovation
and liberalism." Id.
396. CONSTANTINEAU, supra note 368, at 7-20 (describing defacto doctrines in Eng-
land, United States, and Canada). The Acordada's of 1930 and 1943 cite Constantineau
and also rely on unnamed international practices to support their legal recognition of
the defacto government. 1943 Acordada, 196 Fallos at 6-7; 1930 Acordada, 158 Fallos at
290.
397. CONSrANTrIEAU, supra note 368, at 7. The U.S. Circuit Court of the District of
Virginia in Griffin's Case stated, in dictum, that unless defacto laws were recognized:
[T]here would be no security for life, or liberty, or property. It took form and
shape in a statute in the time of Edward as to the rights of a king de facto, but
its foundation was beyond that. Without the rights of de facto governments,
who would recognize the Norman tides against the Saxon barons? Who the
varying rights of York and Lancaster, or Tudor and Plantagenet, of king and
commonwealth, and kings again, of Stuart and Orange, or Stuart and Bruns-
wick? Where would you find your resting place in the history of civilization?
In the Roman Empire? In its Gothic conquerors? In the house of
Charlemagne?... When, where, and how would you base your rights dejure?
... The history of the world is the history of kingdoms and empires, and
civilizations de facto, becoming de jure, because they are de facto."
Griffin's Case, 11 F. Cas. 7, 18-19 (C.C.D.Va. 1869) (No. 5815).
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trol of the monarchy from the House of Lancaster,3 99 the Eng-
lish legislature passed a statute40 0 guaranteeing all rights granted
by the House of York as vested.4 1 Likewise, French and Sicilian
governments held themselves liable for the acts of predecessor de
facto governments. 402 Furthermore, under customary interna-
tional law,403 when there is a change of government within a
state, the new government assumes the previous government's
treaties, contracts, and obligations regardless of the characteris-
tics of the previous government.
40 4
3. Their Existence Established Expectations: The Rule of Law
The Court based its restoration of defacto laws on the prem-
398. TERENCE WISE, THE WAR OF THE ROSES 6 (1983). The House of York was one
of the two principle parties in the War of the Roses, an English civil war that lasted from
1455 to 1485 and that brought about several changes of government. Id. at 5-6.
399. Id. The House of Lancaster opposed the House of York in the War of the
Roses. Id.
400. Edw. IV., c. 1, 3 Stat. 336 (1461) (U.K.). Even though the English legislature
expressly labeled the rule of the House of Lancaster as illegitimate, the legislature rea-
soned that they would recognize the judicial and legislative acts of the House of Lancas-
ter as valid in order to eschew any "ambiguities, doubts, and diversities of opinions,
which may rise, ensue and be taken of and upon judicial acts, and exemplifications of
the same made or had in the time [of the kings of the House of Lancaster], late kings of
England successively in deed, and not of right." Id.
401. Id.
402. JOHN B. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 249 (1906). Both countries,
however, limited their liability for the actions of the predecessor defacto governments to
U.S. claims. Id.
403. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) § 102 cmts.(b), (d) (1987). Customary
international law is a rule of international law originating from either the repeated
practices of states or opinio juris, the belief of states as to what constitutes customary
international law. Id.; see generally BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 141-54 (1991) (explaining development and contemporary understanding
of customary international law).
404. Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 550 F. Supp. 869, 872 (N.D. Ala. 1982),
rev'd on other grounds, 596 F. Supp. 386 (1984), aff'd, 794 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917 (1987) (holding acts creating debt in Imperial China to be
valid in both successor Republic of China and subsequent successor People's Republic
of China); Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. State of Russia, 21 F.2d 396, 401 (2d Cir. 1927). In
Lehigh Valley, the Second Circuit stated:
[C] hanges in the government or the internal policy of a state do not as a rule
affect its position in international law. A monarchy may be transformed into a
republic, or a republic into a monarchy; absolute principles may be substi-
tuted for constitutional, or the reverse; but, though the government changes,
the nation remains, with rights and obligations unimpaired.
Lehigh Valley, 21 F.2d at 401 (quoting MOORE, supra note 402, at 249); see generally
CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 403, at 474-78 (discussing development of obligations of
successor governments under customary international law).
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ise that the Argentine public would panic if they realized that
rights vested40 5 by de facto laws could be revoked if Congress
never expressly or tacitly ratified those de facto laws.406 The
Court first expressed this fear, in dictum, in Godoy.4 °7 The Court
used the dictum in Godoy for its reasoning in Gaggiamo.4 °8
a. The Dictum in Godoy
In Godoy4°9 a former teacher sued to be reinstated in his
job.4"' In dictum, a majority of the Supreme Court stated that a
change in the status of defacto laws would bring about an uncer-
tainty of whether a right that a defacto law granted was a vested
right and, therefore, one that a dejure legislature could not re-
voke. 41 1 The Court feared that this uncertainty might lead to
mass havoc and confusion.41 2 The Court also stated that a lack
405. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text (explaining guarantees of
vested rights in Argentine Constitution's protection of property under Article 17).
406. Godoy, [1991-I] J.A. at 459; Gaggiamo, [1992-D] at 483-84; see supra notes 344-
50 and accompanying text (discussing Aramayo standard requiring express or tacit con-
gressional ratification of defacto laws); see supra notes 351-55 and accompanying text
(describing overturning of Aramayo standard and restoration of defacto doctrine).
407. Godoy, [1991-1I] J.A. at 459
408. Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 483-84.
409. Godoy, [1991-Il] J.A. at 457.
410. Id. In Godoy, Oscar Godoy, a teacher who the University of La Plata fired for
political reasons in 1974, sued to be reinstated in his post. Id. In 1984, Congress en-
acted legislation reinstating teachers who had been dismissed from their posts for polit-
ical reasons, but left the execution of the law to the schools' discretion. Id. The Univer-
sity of La Plata limited recovery to those teachers who the defacto government during el
proceso dismissed for political reasons. Id. Because the school system did not dismiss
Oscar Godoy during elproceso, the University refused to reinstate him. Id. Oscar Godoy
sued on the grounds that the University's application of the law was too narrow. Id.
411. Id.; see supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text (explaining guarantees of
vested rights in Argentine Constitution's protection of property under Article 17).
412. Godoy, [1991-I1] J.A. at 459. The Court addressed the issue of uncertainty by
stating:
[Plarece imprescindible destacar que la vida social se veria seriamente tras-
tornada en ]a Argentina, si sus habitantes tomaran conciencia de que los
tribunales de justicia entienden que en el pais hay miles de leyes y varios
centenares de miles de decretos, actos administrativos, contratos ptiblicos y
sentencias, asi como numerosos tratados-provenientes de periodos defacto-que
s6lo tienen apariencia de tales, porque, en rigor, est~n viciados de ilegitimidad
y subsisten finicamente por una especie de condescendencia-discrecional y
revocable-de los actuales gobernantes de jure ... [C]omunicaria a todo el
sistema politico-social una imprevisibilidad y una incerteza que son
colindantes con la anarquia.
Id. [[I]t seems essential to point out that social life would be seriously distorted in
Argentina, if its inhabitants became aware that the courts believe that there are
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of guidelines as to what constitutes implicit congressional ratifi-
cation of a defacto law would make an enormous amount of laws
passed by de facto governments potentially voidable upon the
whim of the de jure Government. 413 The Court noted that the
Aramayo standard41 4 of express or tacit ratification 4' 5 creates a
special category of rights that are not absolute, but subject to the
legislature's political leanings or whim.416 The Court in Godoy
stated that the uncertainty of expectations outweighs the benefit
of denying authority to defacto laws.417
b. The Holding in Gaggiamo
The Supreme Court took the dicta in Godoy418 concerning
the treatment of defacto laws and incorporated it into its holding
in Gaggiamo."19 During el proceso, Hect6r Gaggiamo was the At-
thousands of laws and various hundreds of thousands of decrees, administrative acts,
public contracts, and sentences-coming from periods of defacto governments-that only
have that appearence, because, strictly speaking, they are fouled by illegitimacy and
exist solely because they have a type of consent-discretional and revocable-of the cur-
rent de jure governments.... [T]hat would bring to all of the social-political system an
unforeseeability and uncertainty that are bordering upon anarchy.] (translation by
Note author).
413. Id. The number of laws vulnerable to abrogation is of particular concern in
Argentina where military governments have been in power for so much of the recent
history. Id. In Godoy, the Court puts that figure at 15 of the 25 years before the deci-
sion. Id. The Court listed such things as employment, pension rights, and the appoint-
ment of bishops as potentially voidable expectations that people have relied upon for
over a decade. Id.
414. Aramayo, 306 Fallos at 74; see supra notes 344-50 and accompanying text
(describing Aramayo standard of express or tacit ratification as sole means of validating
de facto laws).
415. Aramayo, 306 Fallos at 74.
416. Godoy, [1991-I] J.A. at 459. The Supreme Court found that under the
Aramayo standard, "existiria la extrafia categoria de leyes, tratados y decretos desprovis-
tos de 'legitimidad' que, sin embargo, tendrian vidajuridica, aunque precaria y ficil-
mente extinguible por decisi6n del Poder." Id. [there would exist the strange category
of laws, deals, and decrees devoid of 'legitimacy' that, nevertheless, would have judicial
life, although precariously and easily extinguishable by the decision of the State.]
(translation by Note author).
In Gaggiamo, the Court repeated its distrust of the Aramayo standard and the cate-
gory of laws it created that were dependent upon the legislature's acceptance of the
laws and labeled them "subjective" rights. Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 484.
417. Godoy, [1991-I] J.A. at 459. The Court in Godoy stated, "[n]inguna doctrina
judicial es defendible si, en vez de asegurar el orden pfiblico, crea el riesgo de un ab-
soluto desorden." Id. ["[n] o judicial doctrine is defendable if instead of assuring public
order, it creates the risk of an absolute disorder."] (translation by Note author).
418. Id. at 458.
419. Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 483.
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torney General420 of the Province of Santa Fe.421 The provincial
de facto Government of Santa Fe granted Hect6r Gaggiamo a
privileged pension twelve days before the return of constitu.-
tional rule.4 22 Less than two months after the return of constitu-
tional rule in Argentina, the de jure provincial Government of
Santa Fe passed a law voiding Gaggiamo's pension.423 Gaggiamo
sued for the restoration of his pension claiming that de jure law
violated Article 17 of the Constitution" 4 by denying him of prop-
erty in the form of a vested right.42  In a five 4 2 6 to three 42 7 deci-.
sion, the Supreme Court returned to the standard introduced in
Arlandini4 28 of recognizing de facto laws as on par with de jure
ones.4 29 The majority based its reasoning upon the dictum in
Godoy. 430
B. Illegitimacy of De Facto Laws
Those in opposition to the legitimization of defacto laws be-
lieve that de facto governments are not legitimate governments
because they came to power by force. 431 These scholars andjus-
tices distrust the judicial opinions that granted legitimacy to de
420. VERBITSKY, supra note 119, at 155. Hect6r Gaggiamo's official title in Spanish
is "Fiscal de Estado de Santa Fe." Id.
421. Id.
422. Id.; Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 482.
423. Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 482.
424. CONST. ARG. art. 17.
425. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text (explaining guarantees of'
vested rights under Article 17 of Argentine Constitution).
426. Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 485. The Justices Dr. Levene, Dr. Nazareno, Dr.
Molin6 O'Connor, Dr. Baggiano, and Dr. Barra voted in favor of Hect6r Gaggiamo. Id.
Each of these five Justices was appointed to the Supreme Court after the Peronist ex-
pansion of the Court under President Menem in 1990. VERBITSKv, supra note 119, at 53-
68; see supra notes 294-95 and accompanying text (describing expansion of Supreme
Court from five Justices to nine Justices in 1990).
427. Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 485. The Justices Dr. Fayt, Dr. Belluscio, and Dr.
Petracchi voted against Hect6r Gaggiamo. Id. Each of these Justices was on the Court
before the Peronist expansion of the Supreme Court under President Menem. VERBrr-
sKY, supra note 119, at 53-68; see supra notes 294-95 and accompanying text (describing
expansion of Supreme Court from five Justices to nine Justices in 1990).
428. Arlandini, 208 Fallos at 186.
429. Gaggiamo, [1992-D) L.L. at 484.
430. Id. (restating precedent for accepting defacto laws "como fue especialmente
destacado en el caso 'Godoy.'" ["as was especially noted in the Godoy case."] (transla-
tion by Note author)).
431. Nino, supra note 17, at 310; Snyder, supra note 269, at 512; Alfonsin, supra
note 2, at 42-43; VERBrrsKY, supra note 119, at 154-58.
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facto governments.43 2 Furthermore, they believe that a standard
of review for the legitimization of de facto laws exists, and that
this standard protects valid expectations without rewarding injus-
tices.4 3
1. De Facto Governments Are Illegitimate
Many scholars contest the proposition 43 4 that de facto gov-
ernments are the most efficient means of achieving the state's
goals or of determining what those goals are.433 They point out
that defining the goals of the state is not an easy task and that
democracy is a better tool for defining them than an authorita-
rian state. 436 They add that even goals that are clear and undis-
puted should not be brought about at the cost of authoritarian-
ism which would bring arbitrary goals and methods along with
it.437
The Supreme Court has taken the view that defacto govern-
ments, by their very nature, are disruptions of constitutional or-
der.438 Scholars have echoed this sentiment.43 9 These scholars
have also pointed out a flaw in the criterion of the acordada of
1930,440 that a defacto government must pledge respect for con-
stitutional guarantees, by contrasting the de facto governments'
stated intents of abiding by the Constitution and their actions.441
432. Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 490 (Petrachhi, J., dissenting); Alfonsin, supra
note 2, at 44; Marvin E. Frankel, Concerning the Role the Judiciary May Serve in the Proper
Functioning of a Democracy, in TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACV, supra note 2, at 23, 28; Stotzky
& Nino, supra note 16, at 12; PAGE, supra note 208, at 167.
433. Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 490 (Petracchi, J., dissenting); Nino, supra note
17, at 319; Vera Villalobos, supra note 18, at 466-67.
434. See supra notes 392-95 and accompanying text (presenting proposition that de
facto governments are most effective means of governing Argentina).
435. Nino, supra note 17, at 310; see supra notes 392-95 and accompanying text
(outlining argument that de facto government is most effective form of government in
Argentina).
436. Nino, supra note 17, at 310.
437. Id.; see supra notes 267-71 and accompanying text (describing methods au-
thoritarian regime in el proceso used to achieve state goals).
438. Aramayo, 306 Fallos at 73-74 (describing democracy as return to constitutional
order); Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 489 (Petracchi, J., dissenting).
439. Alfonsin, supra note 2, at 42-43; VERBITSKY, supra note 119, at 154-58; Snyder,
supra note 269, at 512.
440. 1930 Acordada, 158 Fallos at 290.
441. Snyder, supra note 269, at 512. In his first speech after his usurpation of
power in 1976, the first leader of the military junta during el proceso stressed that his
government would be based upon "the permanence and stability of juridical norms
which will guarantee the primacy of law and the observance of it by the governors and
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Furthermore, commentators442 have questioned the indepen-
dence and constitutionality of the Court when it issued opinions
declaring de facto governments to be constitutionally legitimate
governments. 443
2. Precedence is Bad: De Facto Government's Usurped
Judicial Power
Justices and scholars have questioned the independence of
the Supreme Court during defacto governments because de facto
governments interfered with the independence of the judiciary
and intimidated both judges and those seeking to use the legal
system.444 The military disrupted judicial continuity by replacing
Supreme Court Justices in 1955, 1966, and 1976.445 During el
proceso, the military government dismissed over thirty percent of
all federal judges.446 The defacto Government's appointment of
replacement judges did not conform with the procedure estab-
lished in the Constitution.447 The military forced the remaining
judges to pledge to uphold the military regime's validity as a pre.-
requisite to staying in chambers.44 The military also intimidated
judges, attorneys, and citizens with actual and threatened physi-
cal violence. 449 The purpose of this intimidation was to prevent
governed alike." Id. at 508. The de facto Government's actions contradicted these
stated goals. Id.; see supra notes 267-71 and accompanying text (describing defacto gov-
ernment's atrocities during el proceso).
442. Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 490 (Petracchi, J., dissenting); PAGE, supra note
208, at 167; Alfonsin, supra note 2, at 44; Stotzky & Nino, supra note 16, at 12. Frankel,
supra note 432, at 28.
443. Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 490 (Petrachhi, J., dissenting); Alfonsin, supra
note 2, at 44; Frankel, supra note 432, at 28; Stotzky & Nino, supra note 16, at 12; PAGE,
supra note 208, at 167.
444. Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 490 (Petracchi,J., dissenting); Alfonsin, supra note
2, at 44; Frankel, supra note 432, at 28; Stotzky & Nino, supra note 16, at 12; NUNCA MAS,
supra note 177, at 387. The National Commission of the Disappeared reported that
during el proceso, "the judiciary became a sham jurisdictional structure, a cover to pro-
tect its image," instead of being a "brake on the prevailing absolutism." Id.
445. Keith S. Rosenn, The Protection of Judicial Independence in Latin America, 19 U.
MiAMi INTER-Am. REv. L. 1, 26 (1987).
446. VERBrrsKv, supra note 119, at 19. Not only did the military junta replace con-
stitutionally appointed Supreme Court Justices with ones who would approve of the
junta's actions, but they replaced nearly a third of all the federal judges in Buenos Aires
and over 40% of those elsewhere in the country. Id.
447. NUNCA MAs, supra note 177, at 391.
448. Id.; Kartheiser, supra note 31, at 250.
449. NUNCA MAs, supra note 177, at 387 (describing intimidation ofjudiciary and
military pressure upon judges to uphold junta's acts). Id. at 412-20 (printing testimoni-
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such parties from using the legal system to hamper the junta's
goals. 450
3. Dissenting Judges in Gaggiamo and Godoy
In Gaggiamo,451 dissentingJustice Fayt45I 2 used the argument,
espoused in the majority opinions in Godoy453 and Gaggiamo,4 54
of the public's uncertainty of what rights are vested, to counter
the conclusions in those opinions.455 Like the majority in
Godoy456 and Gaggiamo,457 Justice Fayt stressed that the public's
concern for the stability of vested rights is a priority, but added
that the most important vested right is governance by the Consti-
tution.458 His argument is not a case of one vested right trump-
ing another vested right, but, rather, of one vested right prevent-
ing the creation of another.45 9 He argued that the guarantee of
constitutional order prevents a government of force from giving
birth to a vested right.460 Justice Fayt warned that accepting de
facto laws erodes the nation's belief in judicial security and poses
a threat to order.461
als from lawyers who military tortured); Kartheiser, supra note 31, at 250. One sign of
judicial intimidation was that the only judge during el proceso to declare the military
junta's government as illegal fled the country in fear, days after issuing his opinion.
Snyder, supra note 269, at 517.
450. NUNCA MAs, supra note 177, at 387; Kartheiser, supra note 31, at 250; Snyder,
supra note 269, at 517.
451. Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 487 (Fayt, J., dissenting).
452. VERBITSKY, supra note 119, at 20. Justice Fayt was one of the initial five justices
that Congress appointed to the Supreme Court after the restoration of constitutional
rule in 1983. Id.
453. Goday, [1991-I] J.A. at 458.
454. Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 487 (Fayt, J., dissenting).
455. Id.
456. Godoy, [1991-I] J.A. at 458.
457. Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 487 (Fayt, J., dissenting).
458. Id. at 486. Justice Fayt stated, "el mds cabal derecho adquirido es el que tiene
la sociedad toda a vivir pacifica y ordenadamente bajo los principios de la Constituci6n
Nacional. Ella es la fuente de todo derecho .... [L]o contrario implicaria el en-
tronizamiento de mandatos nacidos del quebrantamiento de aquella seguridad." Id.
["the most absolute vested right is that that society has to live peacefully and orderly
under the principles of the National Constitution. That is the source of all law ....
[T]he contrary would imply the entrenchment of commands born from the destruction
of that security."] (translation by Note author).
459. Id.
460. Id.; VERBITSKY, supra note 119, at 156.
461. Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 486 (Fayt, J., dissenting). Justice Fayt wrote:
Esa gradual inundaci6n de disposiciones coercitivas de facto en la organiza-
ci6n institucional y en el orden juridico nacional sumi6 al pueblo argentino
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Several Supreme Court Justices and commentators ex-
pressed their belief that the Aramayo standard4 62 sufficiently pro-
tected expectations and provided a check against chaos.4 6 In
Gaggiamo,4" Justice Petracchi 465 stated that history did not sup-
port the majority's fears of uncertainty in Godoy. 466 Justice Pe-
tracchi points out that in the seven years that Congress had the
power to make de facto laws null and void ab initio, the dramatic
threats of anarchy mentioned in Godoy never appeared. 467 Com-
mentators argue that while the Aramayo standard 468 was in place,
there was no mass fear for the validity of pensions, employment,
en la inseguridadjuridica y coloc6 el pais en situaciones limites de desintegra-
ci6n nacional. La Repfiblica se acostumbr6 . . . [a confiar] validez a las
normas [de facto] no por su origen yjusticia sino por la fuerza que los sos-
tenta, subordinando el derecho al poder.
Id. [This gradual inundation of coercive defacto rules in the institutional organization
and in the nation's judicial order, brings to the Argentine people a judicial insecurity
and places the country in situations that border national disintegration. The Republic
became accustomed ... [to conferring] validity to [de facto] rules, not because of their
origin or justice, but rather because force maintained them, subordinating law to
power.] (translation by Note author). In Pignatoro, Justice Fayt further warned about
the introduction of laws that originated outside of the constitutional system because of
their effect on judicial security. Pingatoro, [1992-D) L.L at 89.
462. Aramayo, 306 Fallos at 73-74; see supra notes 344-50 and accompanying text
(describing Aramayo standard requiring express or tacit congressional ratification of de
facto laws).
463. Godoy, [1991-I1] J.A. at 459 (Fayt, J., dissenting); Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at
485 (BelluscioJ., dissenting); Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 486 (FaytJ., dissenting); Gag-
giamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 488 (Petracchi,J., dissenting); Nino, supra note 17, at 319; Vera
Villalobos, supra note 18, at 466-67.
464. Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 488 (PetracchiJ., dissenting).
465. VERBITSKY, supra note 119, at 20. Justice Petracchi was one of the initial five
justices that Congress appointed to the Supreme Court after the restoration of constitu-
tional rule in 1983. Id.
466. Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 490 (Petracchi, J., dissenting). Commentators
have repeated the view that experience does not support the majority's fear of public
panic over what rights are vested. Nino, supra note 17, at 319; Vera Villalobos, supra
note 18, at 466-67.
467. Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 490 (Petracchi, J., dissenting). Petracchi wrote:
El mds rotundo mentis a esos pron6sticos apocalipticos lo constituye en hecho
evidente de que-bajo el imperio de la doctrina que ahora [la mayoria] se
pretende desplazar-los poderes constitucionales han hecho de ella una muy
prudente aplicaci6n, sin que ninguno de sus hipot~ticos perjudiciales efectos
se hayan concretado.
Id. [The most complete denial of these apocalyptic prophesies comes from the fact that-
under the reign of the doctrine that [the majority] now tries to displace-the constitu-
tional powers applied it prudently, without any of their hypothetical prejudicial effects
having come to be.] (translation by Note author). Several commentators reached the
same conclusion. Nino, supra note 17, at 319; Vera Villalobos, supra note 18, at 466-67.
468. Aramayo, 306 Fallos at 73-74; see supra notes 344-50 and accompanying text
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or the appointments of the nation's clergy.469  Commentators47
0
also argue that the Aramayo standard471 sufficiently protected
good faith expectations by allowing for a broad threshold of tacit
ratification.4 72 The argument concludes that by allowing expec-
tations to validate defacto laws regardless of other circumstances,
the Supreme Court in Gaggiamo47 and Godoy4 7 4 ignores moral-
ity.475
III. RECOGNIZING THE ILLEGITIMACY OF DE FACTO LAWS
AD THE NEED TO REEMNORCE CONSTITUTIONAL
INSTITUTIONS
The Aramayo standard 476 for the treatment of de facto laws,
which requires that a constitutional legislature ratify all de facto
laws before they are binding or rights under them vest, repre-
sents a feasible and just standard. 477 This standard recognizes
the illegitimacy of Argentina's de facto governments. 478 Further-
more, this standard does not create the social unrest that the
majority in Godoy 4 79 and Gaggiamo480 feared.481  The standard
(describing Aramayo standard requiring express or tacit congressional ratification of all
de facto laws).
469. Nino, supra note 17, at 319; Vera Villalobos, supra note 18, at 466-67.
470. Nino, supra note 17, at 319; Vera Villalobos, supra note 18, at 466-67.
471. Aramayo, 306 Fallos at 73-74.
472. Nino, supra note 17, at 319; Vera Villalobos, supra note 18, at 466-67.
473. Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 481.
474. Godoy, [1991-II] J.A. at 455.
475. Nino, supra note 17, at 319. The Argentine Supreme Court, "by refusing to
recognize the positive evaluation of democracy as affective or ideological, ignores the
fact that it is always necessary to resort to moral reasons tojustify the application of the
law, since positive law, depending on mere facts, cannot justify itself." Id.
476. Aramayo, 306 Fallos at 73-74; see supra notes 344-50 and accompanying text
(describing Aramayo standard requiring express or tacit congressional ratification of all
de facto laws).
477. Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 490 (Petracchi, J., dissenting); Nino, supra note
17, at 319; Vera Villalobos, supra note 18, at 466-67.
478. See supra notes 434-43 and accompanying text (presenting arguments
stressing illegitimacy of defacto governments).
479. Godoy, [1991-I] JA. at 458; see supra notes 409-17 and accompanying text
(discussing majority opinion in Godoy).
480. Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 485; see supra notes 418-30 and accompanying text
(discussing majority opinion in Gaggiamo).
481. Godoy, [1991-I] JA at 459 (Fayt, J., dissenting); Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at
485 (BelluscioJ., dissenting); Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 486 (FaytJ., dissenting); Gag.
giamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 488(Petracchi, J., dissenting); Nino, supra note 17, at 319; Vera
Villalobos, supra note 18, at 466-67; see supra notes 463-69 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing absence of societal fear over status of rights vested by defacto laws).
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also promotes the creation of strong constitutional institu-
tions,48 2 while simultaneously denouncing the authoritarian use
of force to rule. Finally, the current standard, accepting defacto
laws as legitimate regardless of congressional ratification,483 le-
gitimizes rule by force and creates a dangerous precedent.
A. The Inherent Illegitimacy of De Facto Governments
In a constitutional system, no branch of government should
tolerate a break from the constitutional order or declare one to
be legitimate.484 The Constitutional Constituent Assembly of
1994485 stressed this point by adding the instant nullification of
all future defacto governments as a new guarantee to the Consti-
tution.4 86 The Supreme Court has found defacto governments to
be disruptions of constitutional order several times.487 Even
though de facto governments have facially recognized certain
constitutional guarantees,488 claims to legitimacy on these
grounds fails in the face of the gap between the words of defacto
governments and their actions.489
B. Aramayo Protected Expectations
The Court in Aramayo49 ° held that de facto laws were only
valid when Congress either expressly or tacitly ratified them.491
The Court, in Godoy492 and Gaggiamo,493 feared that the lack of a
482. Nino, supra note 17, at 317.
483. See supra notes 351-55 and accompanying text (discussing restoration of de
facto doctrine in Godoy and Gaggiamo).
484. See supra notes 434-43 and accompanying text (presenting arguments finding
defacto governments illegitimate).
485. See supra notes 358-63 and accompanying text (discussing Constituent Assem-
bly's 1994 changes to Constitution).
486. CONST. ARG. art. 36; see supra note 359 and accompanying text (discussing
addition of Article 36 of Constitution nullifying future defacto governments).
487. Aramayo, 306 Fallos at 74 (describing democracy as return to constitutional
order); Editora Popular, 289 Fallos at 180; Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 489 (Petracchi,J.,
dissenting).
488. See supra notes 386-91 and accompanying text (stating incidents where defacto
governments professed to recognize constitutional guarantees).
489. See supra notes440-41 and accompanying text (outlining disparity between de.
facto governments pledge to uphold constitutional guarantees and their actions).
490. Aramayo, 306 Fallos at 73-74; see supra notes 344-50 and accompanying text
(discussing Court's adoption in Aramayo of standard requiring express or tacit congres-
sional ratification of defacto laws).
491. Aramayo, 306 Fallos at 73-74.
492. Godoy, [1991-I] J.A. at 458.
1996] 1621.)
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clear definition of tacit ratification would lead to widespread so-
cial chaos because of an uncertainty over what rights were vested
under it.4 94 Yet, this chaos never existed when the Aramayo stan-
dard4 95 applied, nor did it appear likely to become a threat.4 96
The Court in Godoy4 9 7 and Gaggiamo4 98 changed the treatment of
defacto laws to solve a threat that did not exist. The cost of solv-
ing this non-existent threat is the prevention of benefits under
the Aramayo standard.499
C. Aramayo Denounces Usurpation of Power
The Aramayo standard500 of express or tacit congressional
ratification 50 1 denounced rule by force and reiterated the Argen-
tina's commitment to the Constitution. Godoy50 2 and Gag-
giamo-0 3 have the opposite effect. By granting validity to every
law enacted by a de facto regime regardless of its content, the
Court in Godoy5 04 and Gaggiamo505 holds that de facto regimes
have the power to vest rights and bind others.50 6 The Court uses
people's expectations as a grounds for legitimacy without consid-
ering whether those expectations were reasonable.50 7 By indi-
rectly stating that people are reasonably justified in expecting all
493. Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 485.
494. Id.; Godoy, [1991-I] J.A. at 459.
495. Aramayo, 306 Failos at 73-74; see supra notes 344-50 and accompanying text
(discussing Court's adoption in Aramayo of standard requiring express or tacit congres-
sional ratification of defacto laws).
496. Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 490 (Petracchi, J., dissenting); Nino, supra note
17, at 319; Vera Villalobos, supra note 18, at 466-67; see supra notes 463-69 and accom-
panying text (discussing absence of societal fear over status of rights vested by defacto
laws).
497. Godoy, [1991-I] J.A. at 458.
498. Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 483.
499. Aramayo, 306 Fallos at 73-74; see supra notes 344-50 and accompanying text
(discussing Court's adoption in Aramayo of standard requiring express or tacit congres-
sional ratification of defacto laws).
500. Aramayo, 306 Fallos at 73-74.
501. Id.
502. Godoy, [1991-II] JA. at 458.
503. Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 483.
504. Godoy, [1991-I] J.A. at 458.
505. Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 483.
506. Id.; Godoy, [1991-1I] J.A. at 458.
507. Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 483; Godoy, [1991-I] J.A. at 458; see supra notes
411-17 and accompanying text (detailing Court's use of expectations as grounds for
recognizing defacto laws).
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de facto legislation to be legitimate, the Court in Godoy50° and
Gaggiamo09 implies that the legitimacy of de facto laws comes
from a legitimate source, a de facto government, and not from
equitable circumstances or the Constitution. The Aramayo stan-
dard5-1 standard, in contrast, labels defacto governments and the
use of force as illegitimate" and defines the only legitimizing
source of laws as the constitutional legislature.51
D. Strengthening of Institutions
Argentina's democratic and constitutional institutions have
never had strong and deep popular support.513 The nation
emerged from a background steeped in authoritarianism and
control by the powerful. 14 A legacy of authoritarianism carried
over to the independent Argentine State515 and well into its con-
stitutional government.5"6 Although a constitution and an insti-
tutional framework existed for much of this time, those in power
often circumvented or ignored it.517 A combination of eco-
nomic and political factors cut short the Nation's attempt at an
open democratic government in 1930.518 With the passing of
democratic and constitutional government in 1930,519 many of
508. Godoy, [1991-1I] J.A. at 458.
509. Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 483.
510. Aramayo, 306 Fallos at 773-74; see supra notes 344-50 and accompanying text
(discussing Aramayo standard requiring express or tacit congressional ratification of de
facto laws).
511. Aramayo, 306 Fallos at 73-74.
512. Id.
513. Corporatism, supra note 176, at 129-30; Constitutional Reform, supra note 83, at
635-38; Peralta-Ramos, supra note 176, at 46-47; see Garro, supra note 15, at 9 (stating,
"institutional problems have been a constant threat to the survival of democracy in
Argentina, but it is precisely at the junction of transition when governments must seize
the opportunity to strengthen the civic values that have never been in great supply").
514. See supra notes 43-58 and accompanying text (describing authoritarian Span-
ish rule in colonial Argentina).
515. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text (detailing lack of political
change following independence).
516. See supra notes 157-64 and accompanying text (describing maintenance of
non-democratic tendencies following founding of Constitution of 1853).
517. See supra notes 154-56 (examining caudillo defiance of government following
founding of Constitution); see supra notes 157-164 (commenting on restrictive democ-
racy).
518. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text (outlining factors leading to
General Uriburu's Coup).
519. See supra notes 182-89 and accompanying text (discussing coup that over-
threw civilian rule in 1930).
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the nascent institutions slowly ceased to exist.520 The ensuing
five decades of defacto and civilian governments that followed 21
did not provide the stable background necessary for the creation
of strong institutions as the state persecuted political parties,522
tinkered with the judiciary,52 3 altered the Constitution,5 24 dis-
banded Congress,5 25 dismissed presidents,5 2  and hampered the
freedom of the press.527 The lack of strong institutions often
forced those who could not otherwise participate in government
to resort to force to achieve their goals.528
Even though Argentina has had a democratic and constitu-
tional government since 1983,529 its democratic and constitu-
tional institutions are not yet stable. 530 The Menem administra-
tion has decreased the independence of the Judicial Branch." 1
520. Alfonsin, supra note 2, at 43; see supra notes 282-83 and accompanying text
(describing need to construct new democratic and constitutional institutions upon re-
turn to democratic government in 1983).
521. See supra notes 182-281 and accompanying text (discussing civilian and mili-
tary governments between 1930 and 1983).
522. See supra note 191 and accompanying text (discussing fraudulent elections
between 1932 and 1943); see supra note 212 and accompanying text (detailing interfer-
ence with political parties duringJuan Per6n's first era); see supra notes 226-55 (describ-
ing exclusion of Peronist party from political system between 1955 and 1973); see supra
note 269 and accompanying text (discussing political oppression during el proceso).
523. See supra notes 444-49 and accompanying text (detailing interference with
judiciary by defacto governments).
524. See supra note 210 and accompanying text (describing Peronist Constitution
of 1949); see supra notes 221-26 and accompanying text (discussing restoration of Con-
stitution of 1853); see supra notes 358-65 and accompanying text (detailing constitu-
tional changes made in 1994).
525. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text (listing coups where military dis-
banded Congress).
526. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text (listing coups where military dis-
missed presidents); see supra notes 232-39 and accompanying text (discussing military's
removal of Argentine president when removal was not followed by military govern-
ment).
527. See supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text (discussing press restrictions
during first Peronist era); see supra note 269 and accompanying text (discussing repres-
sion of media during el proceso).
528. See supra note 193 and accompanying text (describing failure of political sys-
tem resulting in civilians using military to achieve their political goals).
529. See supra notes 282-300 and accompanying text (describing Argentine democ-
racy since 1983).
530. Corporatism, supra note 176, at 129-30; Constitutional Reform, supra note 83, at
635-38; see Stotzky, supra note 32, at 127-28 (describing creation of Centro de Estudios
Institucionales [Center for Institutional Studies] devoted to study of growth and
strength of democratic institutions in Argentina).
531. See supra notes 294-95 (describing Menem Administration's expansion of
Supreme Court to include four new Justices aligned with President Menem).
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The increase in the use of executive decrees to legislate en-
croaches upon the power of the Legislative Branch.532 The
constitutional amendments disrupt the stability of certain institu-
tions. 1 3 The Federal Government has infringed upon provin-
cial sovereignty by replacing the governors of several prov-
inces.53 4
The establishment of constitutional institutions is a neces-
sary step in Argentina's transition to democracy.535 Entrench-
ment of constitutional institutions, however, will not occur with-
out popular support.5 36 Granting validity to de facto laws and,
thus, treating de facto governments as equals to de jure govern-
ments, hampers the establishment of a strong institutional legal
system by tarnishing the public's belief in the Constitution and
the rule of law.537 This particularly concerns Argentina because
the rule of law does not enjoy a strong confidence among the
public.5 3' Because the Aramayo standard 5 9 did not tarnish the
532. See supra note 297 (detailing President Menem's increase in use of executive
decrees of urgency and necessity as means to legislate).
533. See supra notes 104, 363-65 and accompanying text (explaining abandonment
of traditional one-term limit of president for two-term limit); see supra note 360 (detail-
ing change in composition of Senate); see supra note 360 (discussing creation of Public
Ministry as independent branch of government).
534. See supra note 298 and accompanying text (discussing President Menem's
political intervention in provinces).
535. Alfonsin, supra note 2, at 43. President Alfonsin wrote, "only through institu-
tionalization of democratic procedures, dialogue, and participation [is it] possible to
lay the groundwork to establish the sovereignty of law." Id. See Corporatism, supra note
176, at 146 (defining strong democracy as involving "broad and deep popular participa-
tion in decision making and control led by strong participative and ideologically com-
mitted political parties and parliamentary bodies").
536. Jean-Bertrand Aristide, The Role of the Judiciay in the Transition to Democracy, in
TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 35, 39-40. In regard to constitutional insti-
tutions, the former President of Haiti warned, "we must not be naive about the institu-
tions of government. The institutions as we have painfully learned, are extraordinarily
fragile." Id. He continues that justice and the institutions that bring it about must be,
"accepted and furthered at all levels of society." Id.; see also Garro, supra note 15, at 4
(warning, "the most troubling issues posed by the transition to democracy in Latin
America are therefore centered not so much on the creation of new legal institutions,
but rather on the need to develop the necessary degree of consensus in support of
those institutions").
537. See Nino, supra note 17, at 317 (calling acceptance of defacto laws "the most
obvious contribution to the impairment of the democratic process on the part of the
Supreme Court").
538. Garro, supra note 15, at 76-78. In a 1992 poll, 70.5% of Argentina felt that
there was no judicial security in the nation and 63.3% believed that the judicial branch
was not independent from the executive branch. Editorial, Legal Integrity?, BUENOS
AIRES HERALD, Nov. 1, 1992, at 14. In a different poll in 1992, only 30% believed that
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rule of law by recognizing validity in the rule of force, it is more
beneficial to the creation of legal institutions in Argentina than
the standard set forth in Godoy540 and Gaggiamo.
541
E. Validity and the Dangerous Precedent
Defacto governments kept the courts open for two reasons,
to help govern 542 and to validate their regimes.543 The defacto
governments of Argentina viewed themselves as the vanguard of
the society that they were trying to protect.544 These govern-
ments sought a seal of legitimacy from the courts, an institution
of logic and order.545 To obtain legitimacy, the de facto govern-
ments kept the courts open and tinkered with the judiciary, en-
suring that the de facto governments controlled the courts and,
subsequently, the granting of legitimacy.5
The acceptance of de facto laws indirectly grants legitimacy
to de facto governments. Recognizing that de facto governments
have the ability to create a law that binds society as thoroughly as
a de jure government, bestows upon the de facto government a
judicial equality with a de jure government, and, thus, a certain
legitimacy. Ajudicial standard, such as Argentina's current stan-
dard on defacto laws, that grants legitimacy to any aspect of a de
facto government, accomplishes what de facto governments were
the rule of law was healthy in Argentina and 20% that the executive branch treated the
judiciary as an independent branch of government. Segin una encuesta, la mayoria duda
de laJusticia, CLARIN, Mar. 26, 1992, at 5.
539. Aramayo, 306 Fallos at 74; see supra notes 344-50 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Court's adoption in Aramayo of standard requiring express or tacit congres-
sional ratification of defacto laws).
540. Goday, [1991-1I] JA. at 458; see supra notes 409-17 and accompanying text
(discussing standard Court suggests in Godoy of treating all defacto laws as valid).
541. Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 483; see supra notes 418-30 and accompanying text
(discussing Gaggiamo majority treating all defacto laws as legitimate).
542. Owen M. Fiss, The Limits ofJudicial Independence, 25 U. MiAMi INrTER-AM. L. REv.
57, 68 (1993).
543. Snyder, supra note 269, at 519.
544. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (describing Nationalist military
government's perception of self as savior of Argentina); see supra note 247 and accom-
panying text (describing de facto government of 1966 to 1973 view of self as national
savior); Snyder, supra note 269, at 510 (noting that junta during el proceso saw itself as
"the guardian of the national heritage, the exponent of the noblest values of Argentine
society and the true defenders of its Constitution").
545. Snyder, supra note 269, at 519.
546. Id. The defacto governments used the courts to appear as an "actual player in
the game of legal rhetoric, a partner with court, petitioner, and legal analysis in the
search for legality and justification." Id.
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unable to accomplish on their own, veiling their authoritarian
regimes behind a facade of legitimacy. .. ,.M
Granting legitimacy to a defacto government creates a dan-
gerous precedent. The more legitimate defacto governments ap-
pear to Argentines, the less repulsive these governments seem.
The standard in Godoy547 and Gaggiamo5 48 suggests that if the
Supreme Court found past defacto governments to be legitimate,
they might find future ones to be as well. The removal of the
stigma of illegitimacy creates a precedent that casts a shadow
over Argentina's transition to democracy.
CONCLUSION
The Argentine Supreme Court's treatment of defacto laws as
legitimate endangers Argentina's transition to democracy with.-
out achieving the intended greater protection of the public's ex-
pectations based on those laws. By failing to reject the validity of
laws born from authoritarian rule, the current treatment of de
facto laws weakens Argentina's constitutional institutions by al-
lowing for methods of legislation not enumerated in the Consti-
tution and eroding public confidence in the legal system. The
Supreme Court's retreat from a standard requiring express or
tacit congressional ratification of all de facto laws before the
Court would recognize them as valid, sets a dangerous precedent
by recognizing the ability to legislate by force. In order to best
denounce rule by force and to strengthen the rule of law, the
Argentine Supreme Court must stress the inability of defacto gov-
ernments to bind constitutional rule by returning to a standard
requiring congressional ratification of de facto laws. Failure to
return to a standard requiring congressional ratification of de
facto laws bodes ill for the health of Argentina's democracy and
serves as a poor example for other nations undergoing similar
transformations from authoritarian to democratic government.
547. Godoy, [1991-11 JA. at 458; see supra notes 409-17 and accompanying text
(discussing Godoy Court's suggestion of treating all de facto laws as valid).
548. Gaggiamo, [1992-D] L.L. at 483; see supra notes 418-30 and accompanying text
(discussing Gaggiamo majority re-establishing de facto doctrine).
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